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MEET TWO-FACE:
THE DUALISTIC RULE 10b-5 AND THE
QUANDARY OF OFFSETTING LOSSES BY GAINS
Samuel Francis*
The challenge of calculating damages in securities litigation is often
compounded by the phenomenon of investors that have accrued both gains
and losses as a result of the defendant company's same fraudulent
misrepresentations. This Note traces the opposing damages approaches
and accounting methods courts have adopted in these instances to the dual
origins and objectives of the Rule lOb-5 private right of action.
Underscoring the shortcomings in these damages calculations founded
predominantly upon either deterrent or compensatory grounds, this Note
instead strives for a measure that not only balances both imperative ends
but also yields a more sensible and equitable outcome. Namely, this Note
proposes that losses should only be offset by gains when they are
sufficiently linked by an ongoing trading strategy, and that matching sales
of securities with the latest purchases will most clearly reflect gains and
losses during the class period.
INTRODUCTION

After a criminal disfigures half of Harvey Dent's face with acid, the once
District Attorney of Gotham City and ally of Batman goes insane and
becomes the crime boss Two-Face. 1 As a result of his extreme multiple
personality disorder, Two-Face makes all important decisions by flipping a
two-headed coin.2 Although attempts are made to surgically repair Harvey
3
Dent's facial scars, they can never cure his inner obsession with duality.

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; C.P.A. Candidate, 2010. I
would like to thank Professor Richard Squire, James M. Shea, Barry J. Epstein, Raymund
Wong, and Mark H. Francis for their invaluable guidance and feedback. This Note also
would not have been possible without the loving support and encouragement of my wife and
fellow law student, Aviva, and the inspiration of our daughter, Kayla.
1. See Bill Finger, Bob Kane, Jerry Robinson & George Roussos, Meet Two-Face,
DETECTIVE CoMics 66, at 2-5 (DC Comics Aug. 1942), reprinted in BATMAN ARCHIVES,
VOLUME Two 220-23 (DC Comics 1991) (first appearance of Two-Face).
2. See id.
3. See Jeph Loeb, Jim Lee & Scott Williams, Batman: Hush, DETECTIVE COMICs 616,
at 9-10 (DC Comics Aug. 2003); Frank Miller, Klaus Janson & Lynn Varley, Batman: The
Dark Knight Returns, DETECTIVE CoMics, at 15-17 (DC Comics Feb. 1986); Bill Finger,
Bob Kane, Jerry Robinson & George Roussos, The End of Two-Face, DETECTIVE COMICS
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In much the same way, the courts have habitually flipped a two-headed
coin--deterrence on one side and compensation on the other-to decide the
primary objective underlying the most potent private remedy for fraud
available under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb5.4 In the typical Rule 1Ob-5 action, the plaintiff must show that, as a result
of alleged misrepresentations and in reliance on an honest market, he
purchased shares of stock that, when the alleged fraud was revealed, were
worth less than he had paid for those same shares.5 While the securities
laws generally measure damages by the impact of the defendant's
6
misrepresentations on the market value of the stock owned or exchanged,
the commonly forsaken yet inescapable duality of Rule 1Ob-5 has led to "a
confused area of the law where the courts, forced to rely on their own wits,
7
have crafted a myriad of approaches" to calculate damages.
This Note focuses on the conflict between the dual objectives of Rule
1Ob-5 that materializes in deciding whether to offset an investor's losses by
gains resulting from the same misrepresentations. Part I summarizes the
common investment transactions and strategies that give rise to such
scenarios, elaborates on the origins and elements of the Rule lOb-5 private
right of action, and contrasts the seminal cases addressing the elements of
reliance and loss that have seesawed on its primary objective. 8 Rule lOb-5
springs from the Exchange Act, enacted in the wake of the stock market
crash of 1929 to deter fraud and protect the integrity of the market, in which
case violators ought to be penalized regardless of the ultimate harm
inflicted on investors. 9 At the same time, the private right of action implied
from Rule lOb-5 is modeled after common law tort actions meant to
compensate victims, in which case investors' damages awards should be
limited to their actual harm suffered.' 0
Although deterrence and
compensation can theoretically blend to achieve optimal damages, most
federal courts encountering the problem of gains and losses have considered
these objectives mutually exclusive on the assumption that maximizing
damages would provide greater deterrence whereas moderating damages
would produce fairer compensation. "I
Arising from this prevalent "either/or" outlook in cases involving gains
and losses, Part II delineates the opposing damages approaches that federal
80, at 12 (DC Comics Oct. 1943), reprinted in BATMAN ARCHIVES, VOLUME THREE 142 (DC

Comics 1994).
4. See 3 THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.4 (5th ed.
2005); 26 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 9:1 (2007).

5. In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 349 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
6. See 26 KAUFMAN, supra note 4, § 1.4.
7. See 5 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS

ON

SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8:1 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting Koch v. Koch

Indus.,
8.
9.
10.

Inc.,
See
See
See

6 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Kan. 1998)).
infra Part I.A-C.
infra Part I.C.
infra Part I.C.

11. See infra Part I.C-D.
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courts have taken in deciding whether to offset losses by gains as well as
the accounting methods used to match purchases and sales of securities to
compute those gains and losses in the first place. Courts emphasizing the
compensation objective have taken a netting approach to damages that
offsets gains and losses stemming from different transactions, while courts
stressing the deterrence objective have taken a transactional approach that
considers each transaction individually and allows the plaintiff to recover
all losses without any offset for gains.' 2 Correspondingly, the "first-in,
first-out" accounting method tends to increase damages, thereby supporting
the deterrence objective, while the "last-in, first-out" method tends to
decrease potential damages, thus aligning with the compensation
objective. 13 A modem trend among courts within the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to decide whether to offset losses by gains on
a case-by-case basis has paved the way for a more comprehensive approach
to damages, but properly assessing the accounting methods used to match
purchases and sales of securities demands a separate inquiry into the extent
of the relationship between the law and accounting. 14
That said, Part III expands on the Third Circuit's newfound approach to
offsetting losses by gains and examines the methods used to compute gains
and losses in light of accepted accounting principles and standards. Based
on two recent Third Circuit cases, this Note proposes a damages approach
that distinguishes between ongoing and independent trading strategies in
determining whether to offset losses by gains. 15 In so doing, the dual
objectives of Rule lOb-5 cannot only be harmonized, but can also achieve
together more equitable damages calculations. 16 Irrespective of the
damages approach chosen, this Note also argues that the "last-in, first-out"
method, which generally better reflects periodic income, is especially
appropriate in Rule lOb-5 actions. 17 That taxpayers may not use this
method to match purchases and sales of securities and that it may also soon
be prohibited for physical inventories for both financial reporting and tax
purposes do not necessarily justify supplanting the method that is otherwise
most suitable for Rule 1Ob-5 actions.18
In promoting a damages calculus for Rule IOb-5 cases involving gains
and losses, this Note also aims, in general, to dispel the widely held
conception of deterrence and compensation as mutually exclusive
objectives. While they may appear to clash at times, deterrence and
compensation are ultimately just two sides of the same coin that together
inspire the Rule 1Ob-5 private right of action.

12. See infra Part II.A. 1-2.
13. See infra Part II.B.1-2.

14. See infra Part II.A.3, B.3.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part M.A.
17. See infra Part III.B.

18. See infra Part III.B.
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I. Two FACES
Assessing investors' losses in Rule lOb-5 actions to determine the lead
plaintiff or to calculate final damages awards, like any quantification of
economic loss, can be a challenging task for courts. 19 To begin with, a
relative paucity of decisions actually reach the question of damages because
most securities litigation does not proceed to final judgment on the merits,
and the courts considering damages have taken numerous approaches. 20
Further complicating damages calculations, this part highlights some
common investment transactions and strategies, such as short selling and
market timing, which often come up in Rule 1Ob-5 actions. 21 Consequently
delving into the Rule lOb-5 private right of action's statutory and judicial
origins as well as the parameters of its essential elements, courts have
wound up vacillating between deterrence and compensation as the primary
objective. 22 These two faces of the courts are most glaringly exemplified
19. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 4, § 12.12. Since many courts and commentators often use
"damages," "economic loss," and a variety of other similar terminologies loosely and
interchangeably (even though these terms may technically have distinct legal and economic
meanings) when discussing both the largest financial interest for presumptive lead plaintiff
and the amount class members would be entitled to receive if the plaintiffs win the case at
trial, this Note likewise does not distinguish between them. Compare Frederick C. Dunbar &
Marcia Kramer Mayer, Dura and the New Vocabulary of Litigation Under Rule lOb-5,
NERA
ECON.
CONSULTING,
Jan.
5, 2006,
at
Abstract,
available at
https://plusweb.org/files/Events/all.stars6Dunbar-Mayer/2ODura%2OPaper%2OJan2006.pdf
("Duradoes not specifically address damages, but it speaks of 'relevant economic loss' as if
those terms were synonymous, implying that the amount of loss proximately caused by a
fraud is the measure of Rule lob-5 damages."), with Lawrence Sucharow & Christopher J.
Keller, FIFO vs LIFO: Different Ways to Calculate Shareholder Losses for Purposes of
Adopting Lead PlaintiffLead to Different Results, INV. & PENSION EUR., May 2006, at 12
n.1, available at http://www.labaton.com/en/about/published/upload/IPEPracticalsteps_
in-corporate.govemance.pdf ("It is important to note that 'losses' for purposes of
determining the lead plaintiff in a PSLRA action is not the same as 'damages', which is the
amount of money that class members would be entitled to receive if the plaintiffs win the
case at trial. Damages can be described as those losses that were actually caused by the
fraud.").
20. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 4, § 12.12; 26 KAUFMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1 ("It is a rare
case, and a rarer published opinion, which reaches the damages stage. The lack of attention
to damages by the bar and the bench has produced a lack of clarity in the law of damages,
particularly in areas already wrought with complexity. No area of the law is more complex
than the regulation of securities transactions."); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value
of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1421, 1423-24, 1426 (1994)
(finding that the parties' calculations of damages are typically far apart, that these cases are
likewise characterized by expert testimony that is inconsistent and partisan, and cautioning
that "[i]f extreme divergence in damage estimates is not simply a trial tactic, but represents a
fundamental lack of common ground as to how much is at stake if plaintiffs prevail on
liability, it may have important implications for evaluating the effectiveness of class action
litigation for enforcing the securities laws"); Kenneth R. Cone & James E. Laurence, How
Accurate Are Estimates of Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Cases?, 49 Bus. LAW.
505, 506 (1994) (noting that the estimates produced by damage models influence settlement
negotiations by shaping the parties' views of likely outcomes at trial and thus provide the
foundation for settlement negotiations).
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B-C.
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involving gains and losses
by the problem of calculating damages in cases
23
resulting from the same misrepresentations.
A. The Long and Short of Investing
Investors can buy or sell short equity securities, such as common stock,
which represent ownership shares in a corporation. 24 The purchaser of
common stock is entitled to a vote on corporate governance matters and to a
share in the financial benefits of ownership. 25 Investors generally buy ("go
long") shares to profit on an increase in the stock's price over time and to
receive dividend income. 26 Conversely, a short sale is "any sale of a
security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated
by the delivery of a security borrowed by ...the seller." 2 7 Anticipating
that the price of a security will drop in value, short sellers will typically
borrow the securities to be sold and later repurchase ("cover") the same
securities for return to the lender. 28 If the stock's price falls as expected,
short sellers profit from having sold the borrowed securities for more than
they later pay, but if the stock's price rises, short sellers lose by paying
29
more for them than the price at which they sold them.
As distinguished from long and short investment transactions, investors
30 An
also often engage in long-term or short-term investment strategies.
investment strategy is a set of rules, behaviors, or procedures that guide an
investor's selection of an investment portfolio, usually designed around the
investor's risk-return trade-off.3 1 Passive long-term investment strategies,
such as "buy-and-hold," are based on the concept that in the long run equity

23. See infra Part I.D.
24. See Zvi BODE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 44 (5th ed. 2002);
GEOFFREY A. HIRT & STANLEY B. BLOCK, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 74
(The Wall St. J. ed., The McGraw Hills Companies, Inc. 1999) (1983).
25. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 44; ESMt FAERBER, ALL ABOUT
STOCKS: THE EASY WAY TO GET STARTED 13 (3d ed. 2008).
26. See HIRT & BLOCK, supra note 24, at 74.
27. See Regulation of Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2007). Judge Richard Posner
characterizes a short sale as "a sale at a price fixed now for delivery later." Sullivan & Long,
Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Zlotnick v. TIE
Commc'ns, 836 F.2d 818, 820 (3d Cir. 1988) (describing short selling); Argent Classic
Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (E.D. Pa. 2004)

(same).
28. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 90; HIRT & BLOCK, supra note 24, at
74; see also James W. Christian, Robert Shapiro & John-Paul Whalen, Naked Short Selling:
How Exposed Are Investors?, 43 HouS. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2006) (contrasting traditional
short selling, which involves selling shares that the seller does not own but has borrowed
with the requirement that the short seller purchase equivalent shares on the market and return
them to the lender at a later date, with naked short selling, which involves investors who sell
shares of stock they have not borrowed, have no intention of borrowing, and that may not
even exist).

29. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 90-91; FAERBER, supra note 25, at
105-09; HIRT & BLOCK, supra note 24, at 74.
30. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 349; FAERBER, supra note 25, at 9.
31. See FAERBER, supra note 25, at 9.
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markets give a good rate of return despite periods of volatility or decline. 32
A strong argument for the buy-and-hold strategy is the efficient market
hypothesis, which presumes that stock prices already reflect all available
information. 33 Active short-term investment strategies, on the other hand,
such as "market timing," involve making buy or sell decisions of securities
by attempting to predict future market price movements. 34 Whether market
timing is ever a viable investment strategy is controversial, since the
efficient market hypothesis suggests that share prices already reflect all
relevant information, and prices often exhibit "random walk" behavior that
35
cannot be predicted with consistency.
The prevalence of long and short investment transactions as well as longterm and short-term investment strategies has complicated damages
calculations in Rule lOb-5 actions. While short selling is generally a
legitimate transaction used to profit from an expected downward price
movement or to hedge a risk of a long position, it is counterintuitive
because the short seller is betting the stock will decline in value, whereas
most investors take a long position and are looking for an increase in the
stock's price. 36 Obscuring matters further, investors engaging in short-term
strategies might be executing thousands of transactions involving millions
of shares in a company, and at any given time might be buying, selling,
selling short, or purchasing to cover short sales. 37 Consequently, it is more
32. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 349 (noting that a common passive
strategy is to invest in an index fund, which is a fund designed to replicate the performance
of a broad-based index of stocks); JOEL GREENBLATT, THE LITTLE BOOK THAT BEATS THE

MARKET 95 (2006) ("Over the short term, Mr. Market acts like a wildly emotional guy who
can buy or sell stocks at depressed or inflatedprices. Over the long run, it's a completely
different story: Mr. Market gets it right.").
33. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 341. But see Donald C. Langevoort,
Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 851, 920 (1992) (contending that "we have gambled on a simplifying theory.., in
making judgments about securities law").
34. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 24, at 917-23.
35. See id. at 341; BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 24
(2003) ("A random walk is one in which future steps or directions cannot be predicted on the
basis of past actions. When the term is applied to the stock market, it means that short-run
changes in stock prices cannot be predicted.").
36. See Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., No. 00-5965
(PGS), 2007 WL 2814653, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2007); see also David A. Rocker,
Managing Gen. Partner, Rocker Partners, L.P., Presentation to the House Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises: The Long and Short of
Hedge Funds, Effects of Strategies for Managing Market Risk (May 22, 2003), availableat
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/052203dr.pdf (describing the importance that
short selling plays in creating more liquid, balanced, and fair markets). A negative aspect of
short selling, however, is that a holder of a substantial short position may artificially devalue
a stock. See Rocker, 2007 WL 2814653, at *2; Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics,
Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29 (Ct. App. 2007) (involving an action for defamation and other torts
brought by Overstock.com against a publisher of analytic reports on publicly traded
companies and against Rocker, alleging defendants collaborated to produce custom negative
reports on Overstock.com).
37. See Rocker, 2007 WL 2814653, at *15; In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp.
2d 338, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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difficult to determine these investors' rights and liabilities using ordinary
principles of securities law that were developed, for the most part, with
conventional long investors in mind. 38
B. The Rule lOb-5 Implied Private Right ofAction
Congress enacted the Exchange Act in response to widespread fraudulent
and manipulative practices in the securities markets leading up to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. 39 In contrast to the
Securities Act of 1933, which is directed primarily at the distribution of
securities, the Exchange Act regulates virtually all aspects of securities
transactions and the securities markets generally. 40 The Exchange Act also
41
created the SEC and governs its wide-ranging administrative authority.
Violations of the federal securities laws give rise to criminal penalties, SEC
civil enforcement actions and administrative proceedings, disciplinary
associations, and both
actions by securities exchanges or national securities
42
express and implied private rights of action.
"Private federal securities fraud actions are based upon federal securities
statutes and their implementing regulations." 43 The general antifraud
provision of the Exchange Act contained in section 10(b) makes it unlawful
"[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
44
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Pursuant to its authority under the Exchange Act, the SEC promulgated
Rule lOb-5, which provides that it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made ..

.

not misleading.

'4 5

Courts have implied from section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 a private
damages action that "resembles, but is not identical" to common-law tort
actions for deceit and misrepresentation. 4 6 The action's basic elements

38. See Rocker, 2007 WL 2814653, at *2.
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)); see 3 HOWARD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL
WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1:1 (2d ed. 2008) ("The history of
securities regulation has largely conformed to a pattern of flagrant problems made evident by
a financial crisis followed by retrospective investigations leading to the enactment of
remedial legislation.").
40. See I HAZEN, supra note 4, § 1.2; 2 HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9.1.
41. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9.1.
42. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 4, § 1.8.
43. Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(b) (2008).
46. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988)

("Judicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time
have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the [Exchange] Act's

3052

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

include (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission), (2) scienter, i.e., a
wrongful state of mind, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation, i.e., a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the lOSS. 4 7 Because
the Rule 1Ob-5 remedy is not an express one, courts have faced some
difficult questions that might otherwise have been answered in the statute,
including the necessity of proof of reliance by the plaintiff on the
48
misstatement or omission and the appropriate measure of damages.
C. The EntangledElements of Reliance and Loss
1. Easing the Burden: Basic and the Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance
Determining the appropriate measure of damages cannot be separated
from questions like reliance that go into determining whether liability
50
exists.4 9 An "essential" element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action,
"reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's
misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury." 51 Courts traditionally required
purchasers and sellers of securities to establish that they were aware of, and
directly misled by, an alleged misrepresentation to state a claim for
securities fraud under Rule 1Ob-5. 52 Over time, though, courts have
recognized that there is "more than one way to demonstrate the causal
54
connection. '53 As the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson
acknowledged, "The modem securities markets, literally involving millions
of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions
contemplated by early fraud cases, and our understanding of Rule 1Ob-5's
55
reliance requirement must encompass these differences."
In view of that, the Supreme Court established that an investor's reliance
on any public material misrepresentations may be presumed for a Rule 1Ob-5
action. 56 In Basic, former shareholders who sold their stock between
Basic's public denials of merger activity and the merger announcement
requirements." (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975))).
47. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341-42.
48. See 3 HAzEN, supra note 4, § 12.3[3]. Other important questions include the
definition of materiality, the requisite causal connection, and the applicable statute of
limitations. Id.
49. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 39, § 13:42.
50. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769
(2008).
51. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (citing Wilson v. Comtech Telecomms. Corp., 648 F.2d 88,
92 (2d Cir. 1981); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)).
52. See Semerenko v. Cedant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
53. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
54. 485 U.S. 224.
55. Id. at 243-44 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF
TORTS 726 (5th ed. 1984)).

56. Id. at 247.
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filed a class action against Basic, alleging that Basic's statements had been
false or misleading, in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and that
they were injured by selling their shares at prices artificially depressed by
those statements. 57
In determining whether class certification was
appropriate, the Supreme Court upheld the presumption of reliance,
supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory, 58 instead of requiring each
plaintiff to show direct reliance on Basic's statements. 59 The Court found
that the presumption relieves the Rule 1Ob-5 plaintiff of an unrealistic
evidentiary burden and advanced the Exchange Act's policies of requiring
full disclosure and fostering reliance on market integrity. 60 The Court also
considered the presumption rational, since an investor who trades stock at
the price set by an impersonal market does so in reliance on the integrity of
that price. 61 The Court pointed out, however, that defendants may rebut the
presumption of reliance by showing that the price was not affected by the
the plaintiff did not trade in reliance
defendant's misrepresentation, or that
62
on the integrity of the market price.
A few months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Basic, the Third
Circuit in Zlotnick v. TIE Communications63 ruled that short sellers have
standing to sue under Rule lOb-5 but are not entitled to a rebuttable
Zlotnick claimed that defendants'
presumption of reliance. 64
misrepresentations artificially inflated the price of Technicom stock, which
he had sold short, causing him to lose money when he made the purchase to
cover the short sale. 65 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip

57. Id. at 228.
58. Id. at 250; Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The fraud on the
market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market,
the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business. Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. The misstatements
may affect the price of the stock, and thus defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an
indication of the stock's value. By artificially inflating the price of the stock, the
misrepresentations defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of the stock's
value. The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on
misrepresentations. In both cases, defendants' fraudulent statements or omissions cause
plaintiffs to purchase stock they would not have purchased absent defendants' misstatements
and/or omissions." (citing Note, The Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143,
1154-56 (1982))).
59. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47; see also R. Douglas Martin, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The
Supreme Court's Analysis of Fraud on the Market and Its Impact on the Reliance
Requirement of SEC Rule 1OB-5, 78 KY. L.J. 403 (1990). But see A. C. Pritchard, Stoneridge
Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The PoliticalEconomy of Securities Class Action
Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 217, 218 (arguing that the Court in Basic "misunderstood
the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages").
60. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47.
61. Id. at 246-47.
62. Id. at 248-49.
63. 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 821-23.
65. Id. at 819-20.
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Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,66 which limited the class of potential
plaintiffs under section 10(b) to those who actually purchased or sold
securities, 6 7 the court found that Zlotnick did both: he sold shares short and
purchased shares later to cover those short sales. 68 That the sale occurred
before the purchase did not affect the court's consideration of each separate
transaction for the possible effects of fraud. 69 But while allowing Zlotnick
the opportunity to prove his reliance, the court declined to presume it since
70
Zlotnick believed the market price of Technicom's stock was overvalued.
Given Zlotnick's belief that the market in Technicom stock did not reflect
all available information, the court did not find it logical to presume that the
market did reflect all available information when he made his covering
purchases, or that it was reasonable
for Zlotnick to rely on the market price
71
at the time of his purchase.
While the Supreme Court in Basic afforded purchasers of securities a
presumption of reliance, 72 federal courts in the wake of Zlotnick have
differed on whether a short seller's belief in overvaluation prevents the
short seller from benefiting from the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance. 73 Many scholars have criticized Zlotnick's denial of this
presumption to short sellers because it denies protection to informed
74
investors-the very class of traders that ensure the integrity of the market.
66. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
67. See id. at 749.
68. Zlotnick, 836 F.2d at 821.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 822.
71. Id. at 823.
72. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
73. See Douglas A. Smith, Fraud on the Market: Short Sellers' Reliance on Market
Price Integrity, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1003, 1034 n.140 (2005). For federal district court
decisions holding or suggesting that short sellers cannot benefit from the presumption, see In
re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27, 44 (D. Mass. 2004), vacated, 432 F.3d I
(1st Cir. 2005); In re Terayon Commc'ns Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 00-01967 MHP, 2004
WL 413277, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2004); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D.
267, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110
(N.D. Cal. 2001); Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 183 F.R.D. 377, 392 (D.N.J. 1998);
Ganesh, L.L.C. v. Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 487, 491 (E.D. Va. 1998). For
federal district court decisions holding or suggesting that short sellers can benefit from the
presumption, see In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
vacated, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1006); Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite
Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2004); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., No. 988258-CIV, 2001 WL 899658, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001); Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc.,
189 F.R.D. 391, 396-97 (N.D. I11.1999); Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 631 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Fausett v. Am. Res. Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-39 (D. Utah 1982).
74. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds,Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market:
The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 671, 721-22 (1995) ("The result of this reasoning . . . is awkward. If
investors trade because they think a price is attractive, they deny faith in accurate pricing and
waive use of the presumption of reliance, according to the Zlotnick court. Market
participants who correct market inefficiency are deprived of the benefit of a legal rule based
on market efficiency. In essence, Zlotnick allows manipulators such as TIE Communications
to outwit those who are aware of the manipulation."); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Litigation, 55 DuKE L.J. 711, 715 (2006)
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Some have argued that although a short seller believes that a security is
overpriced, the decision to sell does not demonstrate that the seller deems
the market ineffective; on the contrary, a short seller must rely on the
is
effectiveness of the market, because the profitability of selling short 75
premised on the belief that the price would eventually revert to value.
Others have suggested that-rather than interpreting Zlotnick as preventing
the presumption from arising because allowing a plaintiff short seller to
prove the presumption's predicate facts would be illogical given a short
seller's investment strategy-it can be interpreted as a defendant being able
to rebut the presumption because of the mere fact that the plaintiff was a
76
short seller who believed the security price to be overvalued.
At any rate, the fraud-on-the-market presumption for purchasers of
securities and for short sellers in at least some jurisdictions avoids the
evidentiary difficulties of showing reliance and, as a by-product, greatly
expands the size of the class. 77 Once the presumption is in play, the
potential damages available under Rule lOb-5 become enormous as every
investor who purchased during the time that a misrepresentation affected
the company's stock price, and did not sell it before the truth was revealed,
has a cause of action and potential remedies under Rule 1Ob-5. 78 Moreover,
a phenomenon that crops up with the presence of short selling is the
apparent increase in the number of shares of stock beneficially held by
investors over and above the actual number of shares issued by the
corporation. 79 In the case of a Rule lOb-5 action, this apparent expansion
of the beneficial ownership has real consequences since it multiplies the
number of investors who are potential claimants in a suit and
80
correspondingly multiplies the potential damages.
(contending that information traders are the group that can best underwrite efficient and
liquid capital markets, and, hence, it is this group that securities regulation should strive to
protect).
75. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 74, at 769 (asserting that a careful reading
of the majority's opinion in Basic reveals that this is the correct interpretation); see also
Langevoort, supra note 33, at 889-903.
76. See Smith, supra note 73, at 1015-16.
77. See Pritchard, supra note 59, at 221.
78. See id.
79. See Robert C. Apfel et al., Short Sales, Damages, and Class Certification in lob-5
Actions 5-8 (July 2001) (unpublished paper), available at http://schwert.ssb.rochester.edu/
short0l 10.pdf. A short seller borrows a share from one person and sells this share to another
person. Id. at 6. The one who lent it to the short seller and the one who bought it from the
short seller, however, cannot own the same share simultaneously. Id. The buyer becomes the
true owner of record while the lender is not an owner of record, as long as his share is lent
out. Id. While the lender is no longer a shareholder of record, he has a beneficial interest in a
share of stock-an interest that has been created by the short seller's promise to return a
share and to make up for any cash distributions paid by the company in the interim. Id. at 7.
In this sense, the lender owns an "artificial" share created by the short seller, and the short
sale has thus resulted in an apparent expansion of the beneficial ownership of the company's
shares. Id. at 7-8. Naked short selling can even further inflate the apparent number of shares
held by investors. See Christian, Shapiro & Whalen, supra note 28, at 1045-46.
80. See Apfel et al., supra note 79, at 8; see also Ganesh, L.L.C. v. Computer Learning
Ctrs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 487 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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2. A Bridge to Nowhere: Stoneridge and the Blurred Origins of Rule 1Ob-5
Apart from the sweeping implications that a finding of reliance naturally
manifests on damages, the opposing opinions in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,8 1
addressing reliance on secondary actors, 82 allude to a deeper uncertainty at
the heart of the damages controversy.
Stoneridge filed suit against
Scientific-Atlanta and other defendants under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
alleging losses after purchasing Charter Communications stock. 83 Acting
as Charter's customers and suppliers, the defendants agreed to arrangements
that allowed Charter to mislead its auditor and issue misleading financial
statements affecting its stock price, but had no role in preparing or
disseminating the financial statements. 84 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found that the allegations did not show that the defendants
made misstatements relied upon by the public or violated a duty to
disclose. 85 At most, the defendants had aided and abetted Charter's
misstatement, but the private cause of action implied in section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 did not extend to aiding and abetting. 86
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, agreed that
the section 10(b) private right of action did not "reach" the defendants
because Charter investors did not rely on their statements or
representations. 87 The majority held that the section 10(b) private right of
action does not extend to aiders and abettors, and, since a secondary actor
must therefore satisfy each of the elements for section 10(b) liability, the
plaintiff must prove reliance upon a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant. 88 The Court only recognized a rebuttable presumption of
reliance, however, in two circumstances: when there is an omission of a
material fact by one with a duty to disclose, or, under the fraud-on-themarket theory, when the statements at issue become public. 89 Neither
presumption applied here, since the defendants had no duty to disclose and
their deceptive acts were not communicated to the investing public during
the relevant times. 90 As a result, Stoneridge had not shown reliance upon
any of the defendants' actions "except in an indirect chain that [is] too
remote for liability." 9 1

81. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
82. Id. at 766.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 767.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 766.
88. Id. at 769.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Court also rejected Stoneridge's reference to so-called "scheme liability"
since it did not, absent a public statement, answer the objection that Stoneridge did not in
fact rely upon the defendants' deceptive conduct. Id. at 770-71.
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Justice Kennedy also brushed aside the notion that, if this were a
common-law action for fraud, there could be a finding of reliance. 92 Even
if this assumption were correct, Justice Kennedy noted, it was not
controlling because "Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud
into federal law." 9 3 The majority looked to the history of the section 10(b)
private right and the careful approach the Court has taken before proceeding
without congressional direction as further reason to find no liability in this
case. 94 Asserting that "[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private
cause of action caution against its expansion" and that the decision to
extend the cause of action is for Congress and not the Court, the majority
maintained that the section 10(b) private right "should not be extended
beyond its present boundaries." 9 5 The majority reasoned that when the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 96 was enacted,
Congress evidently accepted the section 10(b) private cause of action "as
then defined but chose to extend it no further." 97 The majority thus found
its conclusion "consistent with the narrow dimensions we must give to a
right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute
98
and did not expand when it revisited the law."
In a strong dissent refuting the majority opinion on various substantive
grounds not pertinent to this Note, 99 Justice John Paul Stevens also felt
compelled to "comment on the importance of the private cause of action
that Congress implicitly authorized" when it enacted the Exchange Act and
to rebut the majority's "mistaken hostility" toward the section 10(b) private
cause of action. 10 0 Justice Stevens recounted how, throughout the nation's
history, much of our law was developed by judges in the common-law
tradition: "A basic principle animating our jurisprudence was enshrined in
state constitution provisions guaranteeing, in substance, that every wrong
shall have a remedy."''
In light of the history of court-created remedies
and specifically the history of implied causes of action under section 10(b),
Justice Stevens declared that "the Court is simply wrong when it states that
Congress did not impliedly authorize this private cause of action 'when it
first enacted the statute."'' 102 Rather, Congress enacted section 10(b) "with
92. Id. at 771.
93. Id. (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005); SEC v. Zandford,

535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 184 (1994)).

94. Id. at 772.
95. Id. at 773 (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173; Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991)).

96. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
97. Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 773.
98. Id. at 774.
99. See id. at 774-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 779.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. 779 n.12 (collecting state
constitutions).
102. Id. at 781 (quoting id. at 774 (majority opinion)).
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the understanding that federal courts respected the principle that every
wrong would have a remedy," but the majority's decision cut back further
10 3
on Congress's intended remedy.
This difference of opinion in Stoneridge is by no means novel or limited
to Rule lOb-5, as courts have historically expressed one of these two
conceptions of judicial power to create private rights of action. 10 4 Implying
a private right of action can be viewed conservatively as an exercise in
construing the intent of the legislature, or more liberally, as a court
exercising an inherent judicial power to create common-law remedies for
statutory violations. 105 Although the Supreme Court now typically treats
the implication of private rights of action as a matter of statutory
construction-confining analysis to whether Congress, in enacting a
particular statute, intended to authorize the private remedies soughtl 06-the
Court has nevertheless continued to recognize the long-established private
right of action under Rule lOb-5.1 07 This enduring fundamental divide
evidenced in Stoneridge about the essence of Rule lOb-5 in particular,
however, revitalizes an enigma that has long challenged the Court in the
realm of damages.
3. Getting to Loss: From Randall and Deterrence to Dura and
Compensation
In conceptualizing the key element of "economic loss," courts have only
been afforded a rather rudimentary framework with which to work. The
Exchange Act provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit for
damages . . . shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of."' 108 Courts have generally
applied an "out-of-pocket" measure of damages-"the difference between
the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct"-in section
10(b) cases involving fraud by a seller of securities. 10 9 Other than these
broad guidelines, however, neither Rule 1Ob-5 nor the PSLRA endorses any
specific theory or methodology to quantify economic loss. "10
On one hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
securities legislation that Congress enacted for the purpose of deterring
103. Id. at 782.
104. See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights ofAction, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 557 (1981).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
107. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.

108. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006).
109. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that out-of-pocket loss is the ordinary standard in a lOb-5

suit); see also 5 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 7, §§ 8:4-8:9 (delineating alternative
measures of damages to out-of-pocket loss including benefit of the bargain, disgorgement,
unjust enrichment or constructive trust, consequential damages, and other measures).
110. In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 350 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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fraud should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes.""'
In deciding not to reduce the
plaintiffs recovery in the amount of tax benefits received, the Supreme
Court in Randall v. Loftsgaarden112 rejected the defendants' argument that
recovery under the federal securities laws was strictly limited to the
defrauded investor's "actual damages," and hence that anything of
economic value received by the victim of fraud as a result of the investment
must reduce the victim's recovery. 1 3 Noting that "Congress did not
specify what was meant by 'actual damages,"' the Court held that there was
no "rigid requirement that every recovery ...be limited to the net economic
harm suffered by the plaintiff."''14 The Court elaborated,
Congress'[s] aim in enacting the [Exchange] Act was not confined solely
to compensating defrauded investors. Congress intended to deter fraud
and manipulative practices in the securities markets, and to ensure full
disclosure of information material to investment decisions. This deterrent
purpose is ill served by a too rigid insistence on limiting plaintiffs to
recovery of their "net economic loss." 115
The Court thus found that awarding damages under the Exchange Act
"clearly does more than simply make the plaintiff whole for the economic
loss proximately caused by the buyer's fraud." 1 6 In fact, the Court deemed
it "more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of
windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them."' ' 7 The Court
anticipated that the deterrent value of private rights of action will thereby
"provide 'a most effective weapon in the enforcement' of the securities
laws and are a 'necessary supplement to Commission action."' 118
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also promoted the
compensatory nature of damages in securities fraud actions in finding that
an inflated purchase price does not by itself constitute or proximately cause
the relevant loss needed to allege and prove loss causation. 1 9 In Dura
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo,120 shareholders alleged that Dura made
misrepresentations about a new asthmatic spray device, leading them to
111. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) ("The Court has

said that the [Exchange] Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a
'fundamental purpose... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry."' (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963))).

112.
113.
114.
115.

478 U.S. 647.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 664 (quoting Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 940 (2d Cir.

1984)) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151).

116.
117.
118.
(1985),
119.
120.

Id. at 663.
Id. (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)).
Id. at 664 (quoting Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310
vacated sub nom.Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986)).
See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
544 U.S. 336.
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purchase Dura securities at an artificially inflated price. 12 1 The Court noted
that at the moment the transaction took place, the plaintiff suffered no loss
because the inflated purchase price was offset by ownership of a share that
at that instant possessed equivalent value. 122 Moreover, the logical link
between the inflated purchase price and any later economic loss was not
invariably strong, since other factors may affect the price. 12 3 While the
inflated purchase price suggested that the misrepresentation "touche[d]
upon" a later economic loss, the Court held that "to 'touch upon' a loss is
not to cause a loss."124 The Court reasoned that "the common law has long
insisted that a plaintiff in such a case show not only that had he known the
truth he would not have acted but also that he suffered actual economic
loss."' 125

While recognizing that the securities statutes seek to maintain

public confidence in the marketplace by deterring fraud, in part through the
availability of private securities fraud actions, the Court emphasized that the
statutes were not intended "to provide investors with broad insurance
against market losses, but to protect them against those economic losses
that misrepresentations actually cause."' 126 The Court thus found that
Congress's clear intent was to permit private securities fraud actions only
where "plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional elements of
causation and loss."127
Taken together, the Supreme Court's mixed signals in Randall and Dura
may simply connote complementary objectives of deterrence and
compensation. Some scholars in fact frame the appropriate measure of
damages as a balancing act between general deterrence and compensation
concerns. 128 Notably, basing damages on the net harm that an offender's
acts cause should, according to classical tort theory, achieve optimal
This school of thought equates the objectives of
deterrence. 129

121. Id. at 339-40.
122. Id. at 342.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 343.
125. Id. at 343-44.
126. Id. at 345 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]ilowing recovery in the face of affirmative
evidence of nonreliance would effectively convert Rule lob-5 into a scheme of investor's
insurance. There is no support in the... Exchange Act, the Rule, or our cases for such a
result." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted))).

127. Id. at 346.
128. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 39, § 13:42 ("In general policy terms,
one should be concerned with (1) the necessity of deterring practices that interfere with the
concept of an informed marketplace to which all investors have appropriate access without,
at the same time, discouraging the flow of information to such marketplace; (2)
compensating those who have been damaged by proscribed practices without at the same
time imposing such financial burdens that the proscription is counterproductive; and (3)
avoiding compensating one group of investors at the expense of other equally innocent
investors.").

129. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 611, 651-52 (1985). But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking
Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1500 (1996) ("The present
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compensation and deterrence under Rule 1Ob-5, in that an optimal model of
damages deters misconduct by forcing defendants to pay for the harm they
cause. 130 As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel roundly put it, "True,
people sometimes say that the function of securities law is 'the protection of
just restatements of
investors' or 'compensation for wrongs,' but these13are
1
the objective of efficient operation of the markets."'
More pervasive, nonetheless, is the conviction that Rule 1Ob-5 is in
fact-or at least should be-steered by a single overriding objective. While
private rights of action under Rule 1Ob-5 have traditionally been
rationalized on compensatory grounds, 132 a deterrence-based justification
has taken on increased prominence. 133 Even though truly compensatory
private actions might promote the goal of deterrence, many scholars have
argued that the Rule 10b-5 action does not provide meaningful
compensation for investors. 134 Noting this realistic inefficacy, many
scholars have instead proposed a range of damages measures founded on
the deterrence objective. 135 All told, as a consequence of the varying
significance attributed to the objectives of deterrence and compensation,
courts calculating damages in Rule 1Ob-5 actions have markedly
136
diverged-especially in cases where these objectives appear to collide.
D. The Gains and Losses Problem
Applying the "out-of-pocket" measure of damages can prove difficult
when an investor has bought and sold shares numerous times during the
class period. 137 The class period "is generally the period of time during
measure of class-based compensatory damages... is not well-supported by the traditional
deterrence rationale for compensatory damages in tort law.").
130. See Dane A. Holbrook, Measuring and Limiting Recovery Under Rule lOb-5:
Optimizing Loss Causationand Damages in Securities FraudLitigation, 39 TEX. J. Bus. L.

215, 249 (2003) ("Potential Rule lOb-5 violators can be induced to make correct decisions
.. where that judgment is an accurate measure of the harm they have caused. Therefore,
courts should apply a predictable damage measure.., that adequately compensates for harm
to investors resulting from the defendant's representational misconduct.").
131. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 129, at 613.
132. See 26 KAUFMAN, supra note 4, § 9:13 (contending that "the major thrust of Rule
lob-5 must be compensatory").
133. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between the Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lOb-5, 108 COLUM. L.

REV. 1301, 1314 (2008).
134. See id. at 1325.
135. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 129, at 1508; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD.L. REv. 348, 380 (2007);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its

Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1547 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping
Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 639, 652 (1996); A. C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as

Securities FraudEnforcers,85 VA. L. REv. 925, 945-47 (1999).
136. See infra Part I.D.
137. RAYMUND WONG, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, PURCHASE-SALE MATCHING IN
FIFO, LIFO, AND OFFSETS 3 (2008), available at
SECURITIES LITIGATION:
http://www.nera.com/image/PUBPurchaseSaleMatching-Wong 1008.pdf.
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which plaintiffs allege that the stock price of the defendant corporation was
inflated due to fraudulent statements made by company management, and
ends when corrective statements are made (usually accompanied by a drop
in price)."' 138 Applying the out-of-pocket rule is fairly straightforward
when an investor purchases and sells the same number of shares in only two
transactions or even when there are multiple purchases or sales, but all
generate either gains or losses. 139 According to the out-of-pocket rule, the
investor's damages are equal to the "difference between what [he] paid to
purchase securities and how much [he] received when he sold those
securities." 140 Analogously, out-of-pocket damages from a short sale equal
the difference between the amount for which an investor sold shares short
and the amount spent to repurchase the covering shares. 14 1 Greater
difficulty arises, however, when some purchases or sales generate a gain
and some generate a loss: while everyone agrees that a Rule lOb-5 claim
does not lie when there is no loss, the question is how we should determine
142
when there is a loss.
In such cases, some courts have endorsed a netting approach that offsets
gains and losses stemming from different transactions, while others have
adopted a transactional approach that considers each transaction
individually and allows the plaintiff to recover all losses without any offset
for gains. 143 On the surface, choosing between the two approaches may
turn on whether the Rule 1Ob-5 action is analyzed from the perspective of
the investor as a whole or from each individual investment transaction. The
netting approach arguably coincides with the Exchange Act which provides
that no "person" shall recover a total amount in excess of "his" actual
damages on account of the act complained of, referring to damages with
respect to the investor as a whole. 144 The transactional approach, however,
may be more consistent with section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, which prohibit
certain acts in connection with the "purchase or sale of any security,"
evidently bestowing a separate claim upon each individual investment
45
transaction.
Apart from these overall damages approaches, courts at different stages
in a Rule 1Ob-5 action also face the related but separate question of how to
138. In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 339 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
139. Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d
666, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

140. Id. This commonly accepted view of the out-of-pocket measure of damages, which
looks at the difference between what the investor actually paid and received, technically
differs from the traditional understanding articulated in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S.
647, 661-62 (1986), which looks at the difference between what the investor received and

what he would have received. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
141. Argent, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
142. Id.
143. See Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. Lemout & Hauspie Speech Prods., N.V., No. 00-5965,
2007 WL 2814653, at *14 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2007).
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008); see also supra notes 44-45

and accompanying text.
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match individual transactions,1 46 usually choosing between two distinct
accounting methods: "first-in, first-out" (FIFO) and "last-in, first-out"
(LIFO). 147 This is necessary because a single transaction is neither
profitable nor unprofitable by itself; only when one transaction (purchase or
short sale) is matched with a corresponding transaction (sale or cover to
purchase) can the investor realize a gain or loss. 148 The FIFO method
"assumes that goods are sold in the order in which they were purchasedthat is, the oldest items are sold first,"' 14 9 whereas the LIFO method
"assumes that the most recent purchases are sold or used first, matching
current costs against current revenues." 150 In the context of Rule lOb-5
of
actions, FIFO and LIFO are similarly used to match purchases and sales 151
securities during the class period to measure a class member's damages.
Under FIFO, shares sold during the class period are matched with the first
shares held or purchased at the beginning of the class period, whichever
146. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737, 749 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) ("[TIhe award of damages to the
plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or received,
as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean trading price of that
security during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the information correcting
the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.").
147. See In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also
ROGER H. HERMANSON, JAMES DON EDWARDS & MICHAEL W. MAHER, ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 262-68 (Freeload Press, 8th ed. 2005) (1980).
Accountants have developed four inventory methods to solve valuation problems: (1)
specific identification, which "attaches the actual cost to an identifiable unit of product"; (2)
first-in, first-out (FIFO), which "assumes that the costs of the first goods purchased are those
charged to costs of goods sold"; (3) last-in, first-out (LIFO), which "assumes that the costs
of the most recent purchases are the first costs charged to cost of goods sold"; and (4)
weighted-average, which is "a means of costing ending inventory using a weighted-average
unit cost." Id.; see also STEVEN M. BRAGG, INVENTORY ACCOUNTING: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE 109-21 (2005).

148. See Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp.
2d 666, 680 n.18 (E.D. Pa. 2004). Matching purchases and sales of securities is necessary
according to Argent's understanding of the out-of-pocket measure of damages, but a single
transaction at an artificially inflated price can technically be unprofitable by itself according
to the traditional understanding which looks at what the investor would have received. See
supra notes 109, 140 and accompanying text.
149. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 667 (8th ed. 2004).

Advantages of using FIFO

include the following: (1) it is easier to apply; (2) the assumed flow of costs often
corresponds with the normal physical flow of goods; (3) no manipulation of income is
possible; and (4) the balance sheet amount for inventory is likely to approximate the current
market value. See HERMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra note 147, at 272-73, 284.
Disadvantages of FIFO include the following: (1) it recognizes paper profits; and (2) the tax
burden is heavier if used for tax purposes when prices are rising. See id.
150. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (8th ed. 2004).

Advantages of using LIFO

include the following: (1) it reports both sales revenue and cost of goods sold in current
dollars; and (2) lower income taxes result if used for tax purposes when prices are rising. See
HERMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra note 147, at 272-73, 284. Disadvantages of LIFO
include the following: (1) it often matches the cost of goods not sold against revenues; (2) it
grossly understates inventory; and (3) it permits income manipulation. See id.
151. See In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2006 WL
903236, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006); see also Sucharow & Keller, supra note 19, at 12-
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during the class period
comes first, whereas, under LIFO, the shares sold152
are matched with the most recent shares purchased.
Notwithstanding the variety of plausible justifications for choosing a
particular damages approach or accounting method, federal courts
encountering the problem of gains and losses have seemingly split in line
with a rather simplistic progression stemming from the unsettled origins
and objectives of Rule lOb-5. Courts that take the Stoneridge majority's
view of the narrow statutory basis of Rule lOb-5, and thus Randall's
emphasis on deterrence, tend to favor the transactional approach and FIFO
method, which usually curtail the offsetting of losses by gains. 153 These
courts assume that penalizing violators regardless of the actual harm
inflicted on investors will provide the appropriate level of deterrence. 154 In
contrast, courts that share the Stoneridge dissent's view of the common law
roots of the Rule lOb-5 private right of action, and hence Dura's focus on
compensation, tend to favor the netting approach and LIFO method, which
generally foster the offsetting of losses by gains. 155 These courts maintain
that investors are only entitled to recover their net harm suffered regardless
of the gravity of the wrongdoer's actions. 156 While courts traveling down
either path have a justifiable leg to stand on, it is not as clear how or why
they discount the competing considerations.
II. FLIPPING A COIN
Two opposing views of damages under Rule 1Ob-5 have evidently
emerged in cases involving gains and losses. Part I traced the positions these
two sides have staked to their differing outlooks, epitomized by some seminal
Supreme Court opinions, on the origins and objectives of Rule 1Ob-5.157
Stemming from this fundamental discord, this part explores the opposing
damages approaches and accounting methods that federal courts have
chosen and their justifications for doing so. With respect to offsetting
losses by gains, most courts have straight-out adopted either the netting or
transactional approach, although courts in the Third Circuit have recently
decided this issue on a case-by-case basis. 158 Similarly, as to matching
purchases and sales of securities, many courts have steadfastly endorsed
either FIFO or LIFO, but these decisions have not contemplated evolving
159
principles and standards in the accounting world.

152. See Thompson v. Shaw Group, Inc., No. Civ.A.04-1685, 2004 WL 2988503, at *4
(E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2004).
153. See infra Part II.A.2, B.1.
154. See infra Part II.A.2, B. 1.
155. See infra Part II.A. 1, B.2.
156. See infra Part II.A.I, B.2.
157. See supra Part I.C.
158. See infra Part II.A.

159. See infra Part II.B.
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A. DamagesApproaches
Damages calculations in Rule lOb-5 actions depend on the timing of an
investor's purchases and sales at inflated prices during the class period. 160
Suppose a company's stock initially trading at $10 per share were inflated
to $15 by management's fraudulent statements in 2006, reached a high of
$20 in 2007, and thereafter plunged to $5 in 2008 upon the release of
corrective statements. Shares purchased at the beginning of the class period
in 2006 and sold at the peak in 2007 produce a gain, while shares purchased
in 2007 and sold after corrective statements were made in 2008 produce a
loss. Conversely, shares sold short in 2006 and purchased to cover at the
peak in 2007 produce a loss, while shares sold short in 2007 and purchased
to cover after corrective statements were made in 2008 produce a gain.
Courts confronted with investors that have generated gains and losses by
purchasing, selling, selling short, or purchasing to cover shares in the
company at different times before, during, and after the class period must
therefore decide whether to offset these gains and losses stemming from
different transactions or to allow the investor to recover all losses without
any offset for gains.
1. The Netting Approach
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have traditionally taken the netting approach that offsets gains and
losses stemming from different transactions. 16 1
Emphasizing the
compensation objective of Rule 1Ob-5, these courts found that the Exchange
Act allows plaintiffs to be made whole, but it does not entitle them to undue
windfalls that exceed their net losses. 16 2 In viewing Rule lOb-5 actions
from the perspective of the plaintiff as a whole, these courts have also noted
the injustice in allowing investors to count losses but ignore gains that
63
emanate from the same misrepresentations. 1
In Richardson v. MacArthur,164 an insurance company's employee
offering stock on a subscription basis told a shareholder that he fulfilled all
of his obligations in a transaction and would receive the shares of stock,
when in fact, the employee completed the obligation on the transaction and
took possession of the stock for himself. 165 In analyzing the question of
damages, the Tenth Circuit stated,
160. See WONG, supra note 137, at 3.
161. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1977); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-11 (9th Cir. 1975); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478-79 (5th
Cir. 1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1971); see also infra

notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
162. See Richardson, 451 F.2d at 43-44; see also infra notes 164-68 and accompanying

text.
163. See Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 878; see also infra notes 179-84 and accompanying
text.
164. 451 F.2d 35.

165. Id. at 37-39.
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[I]t is a well recognized rule that the complaining party is entitled to be
made whole. That is, he is entitled to be compensated only to the extent
that he received less than what he was entitled to under the agreement.
He cannot, however,
recover in excess of that to which he was entitled in
166
making him whole.
The court found that the plaintiff actually realized a profit on his sale and
that the profit should be included in reducing his damages, reasoning that he
"should not be allowed to retain this profit in silence while pleading to be
made whole for his losses." 167 Rather than giving the plaintiff an "undue
windfall," the court held that his total losses should be "reduced by any
dividends, profits, or other payments actually received in transactions
involving the stock, together with the settlement of claims against the
16 8
purchaser by which he [was] benefited."'
169
Similarly, shareholders of a bank holding company in Wolfv. Frank
claimed that their equity interest was diluted by the company's failure to
fulfill its promise-not to allow more than a certain number of people to
purchase shares before the company's initial public offering-that induced
the shareholders to purchase stock. 170 Given, however, that the district
court granted shareholders the option to rescind the purchase of their
remaining shares, that the shareholders made a profit on their original
purchase of the stock, and that "Rule 1Ob-5 only provides for recovery of
actual damages ... and not for loss of speculative profits," the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the "plaintiffs [were] unable to show that they suffered any
171
damages compensable under Rule 1Ob-5."
The question of damages also often arises in class actions when
defendants contend that the interests of class members in proving damages
from price inflation irreconcilably conflict because some class members
will desire to maximize the inflation existing on a given date while others
173
will desire to minimize it. 172 The Ninth Circuit in Blackie v. Barrack
conceded that class members might ultimately have differing interests, but
determined that such potential conflicts do not invalidate class
certification. 174 The court noted that under the out-of-pocket standard, each
purchaser recovers the difference between the inflated price paid and the
value received, plus interest on the difference.175 If the stock was resold at
an inflated price, the investor's damages, limited to "actual damages," must
be diminished by the inflation he recovered from his purchase. 176 Each
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 471-72.
Id. at 478-79.
See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975).
524 F.2d 891.
Id.at 908-11.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 908-09.
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investor is therefore interested in proving that some intervening event
177
diminished the inflation persisting in the stock price when he sold.
Despite this unavoidable conflict resulting from offsetting losses by gains,
the court held that any conflict was peripheral and substantially outweighed
in establishing the
by the class members' overriding common interest
78
existence and materiality of misrepresentations. 1
Finally, in Abrahamson v. Fleschner,179 limited partners in an investment
partnership claimed that the general partners misreported the partnership's
investments in unregistered securities. 180 The Second Circuit disagreed
with the lower court's blanket finding that "since plaintiffs realized a net
profit on their overall limited partnership investment, they failed to prove
damages compensable under [Rule lOb-5]."' 18 1 This was not to say,
however, "that a plaintiff may recover for losses, but ignore his profits,
where both result from a single wrong."' 182 The court therefore concluded
that "[t]he proper measure of damages . . . would be that part of net losses
incurred on unregistered securities after the point when the defendants'
representations became fraudulent[,] which stems from the portion of those
investments inconsistent with defendants' representations."' 183 As the
Second Circuit clarified a few days later, "For damages purposes under the
Exchange Act, the transaction cannot be fractionated, since otherwise
'actual damages on account of the act complained of would be
84
exceeded."1
In short, courts regarding compensation as the primary objective under
Rule 1Ob-5 and viewing damages from the perspective of the investor as a
whole have taken a netting approach that offsets gains and losses stemming
from different transactions.

177. Id. at 909-10.
178. Id.; see also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir.
1987); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring). But see Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco
Sys., No. C 01-20418 JW,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27008, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. May 27,
2004) (holding that "every time Plaintiffs purchased stock at an allegedly inflated price
during the Class Period, they were arguably injured at the moment of the purchase,
notwithstanding earlier or later sales").
179. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).
180. Id. at 866-67.
181. Id. at 878.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 879. But see In re Blech Sec. Litig., 94 Civ. 7696 (RWS), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4650, at *73 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp.
1154, 1172 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("While such an off-set may be appropriate for purposes of
sentencing in a criminal case, [the defendant] presents no reason why he is entitled to this
off-set here, let alone why a perpetrator of securities fraud would generally have any off-set
against the class merely because there were some purchasers fortunate enough not to have
been injured.").
184. See Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1314 (2d Cir. 1977)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006)) (citing Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740,
746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
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2. The Transactional Approach
Despite these leading circuit court decisions adopting the netting
approach, a number of courts have more recently taken a transactional
approach that considers each transaction individually and allows the
plaintiff to recover all losses without any offset for gains. While not
entirely abandoning the netting approach, some courts in the
abovementioned circuits have distinguished those earlier rulings as
applying only to the commission of a single wrong or to the execution of a
single transaction. 185 Moreover, several district courts in other circuits have
outright rejected the aggregation of damages, finding that it undermines the
deterrence objective of the federal securities laws 186 and deviates from the
language of the statutes that appear to treat every transaction as a separate
87
claim for damages.
188
Although the Ninth Circuit had already adopted the netting approach,
the court later distinguished the particular fraud of "churning," in which a
broker executes excessive transactions to generate fees, since it involves
two separate wrongs. 189 In Nesbit v. McNeil,190 the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs should not recover damages for churning where there was an
increase in portfolio values that exceeded the amount of commissions
charged. 19 1 The court explained, however, that churning causes two
separate and distinct possible harms: first, the investor is harmed by having
paid the excessive commissions to the broker, and second, the investor is
harmed by the diminished value of his portfolio caused by the broker's
having executed transactions to generate fees that were unsuitable for the
investor. 192 Even though the plaintiffs only suffered one of those harms,
the court found no reason that they should be denied a recovery when their
portfolio increased in value, either because of or in spite of the defendants'
activities. 193 The court held that a plaintiff may recover separately either or
both types of damages and that "gains in portfolio will not offset losses in
commissions."' 94 Not to be misconstrued, though, the court clarified that it
was not overturning its use of the netting approach in prior cases where "the
issue was portfolio loss, and, of course, dividends gained on the portfolio
185. See Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 385-87 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Clinton Oil Co.
Sec. Litig., M.D.L. No. 137, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16787, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 22, 1977);
see also infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
186. See Kane v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., No. 86-551-CIV-MARCUS, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19022, at *23 (S.D. Fla. May 3, 1989); see also infra notes 204-10 and

accompanying text.
187. See Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp.
2d 666, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see also infra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
188. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1975); see also supra notes
172-78 and accompanying text.
189. See Nesbit, 896 F.2d at 385-87.
190. 896 F.2d 380.
191. Id. at 385.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 386.
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were properly considered in that context." 195 In this case, however, the loss
arose out of commissions on trades that never should have taken place
regardless of whether the portfolio value went up, went down, or stayed the
same. 196 That, according to the court, was "a separate wrong for which
197
damages are separately recoverable."
Similarly, at least one district court limited the Tenth Circuit's earlier
adoption of the netting approach' 98 to cases involving gains and losses from
a single transaction. In In re Clinton Oil Co. Securities Litigation,19 9 court
representatives disallowed many claims on a settlement fund on the grounds
that those claimants had not suffered any actual damages since they realized
a net profit on sales of the stock when aggregate gains and losses were
offset.2 00 The court noted that Richardson offset net losses and profits
realized on sales of stock purchased in a single transaction, but
distinguished this case, in which claimants acquired their stock in multiple
purchase transactions and sold it at different times. 20 1 "Under the
Richardson rule, offsetting net losses and profits realized on the sale of
stock acquired in a single purchase transaction would be warranted, but the
'20 2
case says nothing about the multiple purchase transaction situation.
Taking the transactional approach instead, the court ruled that "[n]et profits
and losses realized on sales of stock acquired in a single purchase
transaction should be offset, but profit/loss margins on sales of shares
obtained in separate and independent purchase transactions should not be
20 3
offset for the purpose of reaching a net figure."
Where circuit courts had not yet ruled on the issue, some district courts
have stressed the deterrence objective of the Exchange Act in taking the
transactional approach. In Kane v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc.,204 the
plaintiffs claimed that an arbitration panel erred in reducing their losses on
one transaction by the gains realized on a separate transaction, and that the
proper damages approach under both state and federal securities laws was
to treat each transaction separately. 20 5 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida agreed that "[s]uch an aggregation method for
the calculation of out of pocket damages in a securities action undermines
195. Id. at 386 n.6.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206,
1217-19 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that churning is not excused by the fact that the account
realizes a net profit, because otherwise, "securities brokers would be free to chum their
customers' accounts with impunity so long as the net value of the account did not fall below
the amount originally invested").
198. See Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1971); see also supra
notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
199. M.D.L. No. 137, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16787 (D. Kan. Mar. 22, 1977).

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at * 1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *5.
No. 86-551-C1V-MARCUS, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19022 (S.D. Fla. May 3, 1989).

205. Id. at * 15.
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one of the principal goals of both federal and state securities laws:
deterring fraud. ' ' 206 The court cited the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia in Merchant v. Oppenheimer & Co. 20 7 that likewise
found "no reason in logic or in law why either the buyer or the seller should
be required to deal with each such violation in the same manner or be
required to aggregate them. '208 The court in Merchant found it difficult to
characterize a fraud victim's remedy a "windfall," even if it exceeded total
out-of-pocket loss, since "a buyer of securities [was intended] to recover
damages for any sale of securities in violation of the statute, regardless of
whether the buyer happened to profit from other sales of securities in
violation of the statute. ' 209 The court in Kane also noted that if the netting
approach advanced by the defendants were adopted, "it could serve as a
license for broker-dealers to defraud their customers with impunity up to
the point where losses equaled prior gains," and that was clearly not
intended by the drafters of either state or federal antifraud provisions. 2 10
Other district courts have also asserted that the transactional approach is
supported by the plain language of the statutes. In Argent Classic
Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp.,211 arbitrageurs that
invested heavily in the securities of Rite Aid sued Rite Aid, several of its
former executives, and its former auditor when details of an alleged billiondollar accounting fraud surfaced.2 1 2 In considering damages, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the language
of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 more consistent with a transaction-based
methodology than a cumulative one: 2 13
Both provisions make it illegal for someone to make materially
misleading statements "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.".. . By using the singular nouns "purchase" or "sale", Congress
and the SEC focus on each transaction individually. Neither the statute
nor the Rule authorize any sort of aggregation
of purchases or sales that
21 4
could sanction the cumulative approach.
Argent acknowledged that a transaction-based methodology generates
higher damages than a cumulative methodology because the former ignores
profitable transactions and the latter includes them to offset unprofitable
transactions. 2 15 The court reasoned, however, that "[i]f one conceptualizes
every multiple-share transaction as multiple single-share transactions, then

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at *23.
568 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Va. 1983).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 643-44.
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *23.

211. 315 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

212. Id. at 669.
213. Id. at 680.
214. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008)); see also In re
Sepracor Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 52, 54 (D. Mass. 2005).
215. Argent, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
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any apparent unfairness to defendants dissipates." 2 16 Or as another court
put it, "A plaintiffs claim [should be] determined on the basis of each
individual share; just as a plaintiff is not required to offset the gain realized
from a contract that has not been breached by a defendant against the losses
'217
accrued from those contracts actually breached by the defendant.
In short, courts regarding deterrence as the primary objective under Rule
lOb-5 and viewing damages from the perspective of each individual
investment transaction have taken a transactional approach that considers
each transaction individually and allows the plaintiff to recover all losses
without any offset for gains.
3. Third Circuit Cases
Declining to adopt one damages approach over the other, two courts in
the Third Circuit have recently resolved instead to embark on a case-bycase expedition. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania led the way in In re
Cigna Corp. Securities Litigation,2 18 which dealt with alleged losses the
Pennsylvania Employees Retirement System (SERS) sustained on
investments in the stock of Cigna Corp. 2 19 SERS managed its portfolio
through twenty-three external investment managers, with each manager
investing the funds allocated to it and each manager's performance
measured separately. 220 During the class period, SERS had positions in
Cigna in six different managers' accounts. 2 2 1 Some managers engaged in
only long transactions, one engaged in only short selling, and others had
both long and short transactions. 222 At any given time during the class
period, one or more of the managers might be buying Cigna stock, selling,
223
selling short, or purchasing to cover short sales.
The opposing parties and their expert witnesses sparred about whether
the shares in different accounts should be aggregated. 224 Pushing the
netting approach, the defendants contended that treating shares in different
accounts separately was contrary to modern portfolio theory, which
governed how SERS treated its own investments, 22 5 and would also
216. Id.
217. Burke v. Ruttenberg, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1302 n.32 (N.D. Ala. 2000); see also 26
KAUFMAN, supra note 4, § 9:11 (viewing individual securities transactions as contracts,
which, when breached, give rise to contract-based damages).
218. 459 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
219. Id. at 339. "SERS," as abbreviated by the court, stands for "State Employee
Retirement System." Id.
220. Id. at 341.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 342-48.

225. SERS followed modem portfolio theory, which emphasizes that an investor should
focus on an entire portfolio instead of any individual security theory, by employing twentythree external investment managers in the investment management of its assets. Id. at 34344. See generally Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management

Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 721 (1976).
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effectively give SERS an insurance policy for any account that registered a
loss. 226 Moreover, the defendants claimed that when all the transactions
were aggregated, SERS incurred no economic loss because it was a net
seller of Cigna stock during the class period in which the price was rising
227
and thus actually benefited from the inflation rather than suffering a loss.
SERS countered that the defendants' argument depended on methodologies
not normally used for calculating gain or loss on a particular stock and that
the defendants' offset theory has been "'uniformly rejected by Courts in this
District and elsewhere, has never been accepted by any court and is
contrary to well-established law and the [PSLRA].'" 228 Citing many of the
abovementioned cases, 229 the court found "several decisions of record in
which courts have criticized the results of a transaction-based
methodology," but also "a significant amount of authority which would
allow a jury to apply a transaction-based methodology, if based on adequate
evidence, to calculate economic loss and damages." 230
Having
"fundamental concerns... about adopting any specific theory as a matter of
law," the court held that "[t]he specific calculation of damages in this case
should be resolved1 based on a trial record, rather than at the summary
23
judgment stage."
On the heels of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's decision in In re
Cigna, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in Rocker
232
Management, LLC v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N. V
considered claims arising from a hedge fund's short positions in a company
233
that had allegedly committed a host of frauds and misrepresentations.
Rocker initially identified the stock of Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products
(L & H) as a desirable security to short based on publicly available
information. 234 As time went on, however, Rocker grew suspicious that L
235
& H had engaged in related party transactions to inflate reported sales.
While continuing to increase its short position in L & H, Rocker
campaigned to expose the alleged fraud by contacting financial analysts,
236
publishing magazine articles, and requesting an SEC investigation.
Following an investigative report published by the Wall Street Journal

226. In re Cigna, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 348 (alteration in original) (quoting Lead Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Seeking Dismissal of SERS'
Claims for Lack of Economic Loss and Loss Causation at 5, In re Cigna, 459 F. Supp. 2d
338 (Civil Action No. 02-8088), 2006 WL 1760141).
229. See supra Part IIA-B.

230. In re Cigna, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 351, 354.
231. Id. at 352, 354.
232. Civil Action No. 00-5965 (PGS), 2007 WL 2814653 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2007).

233. See id. at *1-7.
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id.

236. Id. at *3-6.
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exposing fraudulent activities at L & H237 and the subsequent SEC
investigation, L & H admitted to errors in its figures and refiled its financial
statements, ultimately reversing 70% of its revenues for the previous three
2 38
years.
In determining whether Rocker suffered an economic loss, the court
deliberated whether to net the gains and losses of Rocker's short sales or to
consider each short sale individually and allow Rocker to recover all losses
without any offset for gains. 2 39 The court noted that "various circuits are
inconsistent-some utilizing the transactional approach, and some using the
netting approach," but the "Third Circuit has not squarely confronted the
issue." 240 Rather than adopting either approach as a blanket rule, the court
decided that "whether the netting or transactional approach is utilized
depends on the circumstances," and, "[s]ince using the netting or
transactional approach is a fact-sensitive inquiry, it is best accomplished on
a case-by-case basis."' 24 1 In this instance, the court concluded that the
netting approach was more appropriate because it better reflected Rocker's
activities during the damage period. 242 Rocker had made "hundreds, if not
thousands, of short transactions involving millions of shares on an ongoing
basis for a period of about 30 months." 243
Rocker constantly
communicated with regulators, analysts, and reporters about L & H's
operations and financial reporting during the period and continually
adjusted its position in L & H. 244 Given this "continuum of activity," the
court held that losses should be offset by gains generated by Rocker's
"ongoing trading strategy" to manage its position in L & H stock. 245
While these cases in the Third Circuit have made significant headway in
rounding up the various theories and arguments for choosing a damages
approach, the courts left the contiguous accounting method question
unanswered. As the expert witnesses unsurprisingly disagreed on whether
to use FIFO or LIFO to match purchases and sales of securities, the court in
In re Cigna examined the issue but found "no appellate ruling that a judge
must charge a jury that one of these is proper to the exclusion of the
other." 246 Similarly, Rocker "left for another day" the manner in which
particular short positions should be matched with covering purchases,
resolving to entertain arguments from the parties as to an appropriate
24 7
method should the matter go forward.

237. See Mark Maremont, Jesse Eisinger & Meeyoung Song, Tech Firm's Korean
Growth Raises Eyebrows, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2000, at C1.
238. Rocker, 2007 WL 2814653, at *6-7.
239. Id. at*14.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at *15.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
Rocker, 2007 WL 2814653, at *13 n.13.

3074

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

B. Accounting Methods
Courts have identified two key differences between the FIFO and LIFO
methods used to match purchases and sales of securities in Rule IOb-5
actions. 248 Suppose an investor purchases 1000 shares of a company's
stock in 2006 at $10, purchases another 1000 shares in 2007 at $15, and
then sells 1000 shares in 2008 at $12. At the end of 2008, corrective
statements are made, and the court determines that the class period spanned
all three years. Using FIFO to calculate the gain or loss on the purchase
and sale of securities, the purchase price is $10 x 1000 = $10,000, and the
sale price is $12 x 1000 = $12,000, for a gain of $2000. Using LIFO, on
the other hand, the purchase price is $15 x 1000 = $15,000, and the sale
price is $12 x 1000 = $12,000, for a loss of $3000. While this classic
difference between FIFO and LIFO stems from the discrepancy in price
between earlier and later securities purchased, another major difference
emerges specifically in Rule 1Ob-5 actions. Suppose the price of the stock
remained $10 in 2007 and that the class period only covered 2007 and
2008. Using FIFO, the sale at an artificially inflated price in 2008 is
matched with the earlier purchase in 2006, but, since that purchase predated
the class period, the entire transaction resulting in a gain of $2000 will be
excluded from the damages calculation. Using LIFO, however, the sale at
an artificially inflated price in 2008 is matched with the later purchase in
2007, and, since that purchase occurred during the class period, the
transaction resulting in a gain of $2000 will be included in the damages
calculation. 249 Hence, the method used may not only determine the extent
of the gain or loss on a matched transaction, but also whether or not the
transaction occurred during the class period and, consequently, whether to
be included at all in the damages calculation.
1. The FIFO Method
The FIFO method, which matches the first shares sold with the first
shares purchased, usually produces greater damages awards. Since the first
shares purchased are very often preclass period purchases, the first shares
sold at artificially inflated prices are matched with these preclass purchases
2 50
and the likely resulting gain is excluded from the damages calculation.
Only thereafter are class period sales matched with class period purchases
248. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
249. Given the fact-specific nature of Rule l0b-5 actions, this presumption that FIFO will

exclude preclass period gains and thereby produce higher damages than LIFO is most often,
although not always, the case. Clearly, no gains would be excluded where there are no
preclass period purchases. Moreover, even if there are preclass period purchases, FIFO
would conceivably produce lower damages where, for example, the inception of the class
period saw a decline in stock price, albeit one tempered by the company's
misrepresentations, so that matching preclass period purchases with sales early on in the
class period would generate losses. Such exceptions notwithstanding, Parts II.B. I and II.B.2
demonstrate that FIFO will produce higher damages in the vast majority of cases.
250. See In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 303 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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to calculate damages. 251 Courts using FIFO in Rule lOb-5 actions reason
that a plaintiffs claim is based on losses that resulted from purchases of
stock made during the class period, and, as such, any gains made on sales of
shares purchased before the class period are irrelevant. 2 52 These courts also
point out that the FIFO method, which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
consistently uses, 253 is a firmly established methodology for calculating loss
254
for tax purposes in the context of securities investments.
A number of district courts have used FIFO to approve the lead plaintiff
in securities fraud class actions. 2 55 In In re Veeco Instruments, Inc.
Securities Litigation,256 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that a pension trust was the presumptive lead plaintiff based
on its investments in the corporation's securities and its financial losses
under FIFO. 257 While the pension trust admitted that it purchased shares of
Veeco stock and that it sold those shares at a profit, the pension trust
argued, using FIFO to match purchases and sales, that it actually lost money
on its Veeco holdings. 258 The court agreed that FIFO is the appropriate
method for matching purchases and sales of securities in considering the
financial stake of a movant for lead plaintiff status, "just as it is the well'259
settled methodology for computing losses on securities for tax purposes.
The court held that if there were a fraud here, the plaintiff had a claim that it
suffered a loss as a result of that fraud, and it did not find
that the plaintiff
2 60
had "in any way misled the court concerning its losses.

251. See id.
252. See In re Schering-Plough Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A. 01-0829, 2003 WL
25547564, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 10,.2003). The FIFO method is also arguably more consistent
with the PSLRA's preference that institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, as it often
favors institutional investors that typically hold large blocks of stock that were acquired prior
to the alleged fraud. See In re CardinalHealth, 226 F.R.D. at 303.
253. The IRS permits taxpayers to use either FIFO or specific identification to match
purchases and sales of securities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) (2008); infra notes 295-99.
254. See Thompson v. Shaw Group, No. Civ.A.04-1685, 2004 WL 2988503, at *4 n.5
(E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2004) (citing Helvering v. Campbell, 313 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1941)).
255. See In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 330, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. C 01-20418 JW,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27008, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (finding that plaintiffs
sought damages consistent with the FIFO accounting method, "which has been established
as a legitimate method for computing losses or gains from stock purchases or sales"); In re
Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 WL 25547564, at *9 (using FIFO to calculate the plaintiff's
loss in connection with its purchases of Schering-Plough stock during the class period); see
also In re Chipcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. 95-11114-DPW, 1997 WL 1102329, at
*24 (D. Mass. June 26, 1997) (mandating FIFO to calculate recognized claims on a net
settlement fund).
256. 233 F.R.D. 330.
257. Id. at 333.

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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Courts have reluctantly used FIFO in other instances. 26 1 In Thompson v.
Shaw Group, Inc.,26 2 plaintiffs competed for appointment of lead plaintiff
and counsel in a proposed class action involving allegations of securities
fraud in the purchase of Shaw Group's stock. 263 For the immediate narrow
purpose of considering the financial stake of movants for lead plaintiff, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana resorted to the
traditional FIFO method.2 64 But for ultimately deciding damages in future
phases of the litigation, the Court indicated that "FIFO may be
' '265
insufficiently accurate and jettisoned in favor of LIFO.
So under FIFO, sales during the class period are matched with the earliest
purchases to compute gains or losses on individual transactions. Since
these earliest purchases were very often made before the class period, many
or all gains resulting from sales during the class period at an artificially
inflated price will be excluded from the damages calculation.
Consequently, the prospect of offsetting losses by gains under FIFO "would
appear to be largely irrelevant" as these gains are eliminated at the
outset.266 Courts using FIFO thus align with the transactional approach and
the view of deterrence as the primary objective of Rule 1Ob-5.
2. The LIFO Method
More recently, district courts have "'generally rejected FIFO as an
appropriate means of calculating losses in securities fraud cases"' 2 67 and
instead prefer the LIFO method, which matches the first shares sold with
the last shares purchased. The main advantage of LIFO is that it takes into
account gains that might have accrued to plaintiffs during the class period
due to the inflation of the stock price, whereas FIFO ignores many or all8
26
sales occurring during the class period and hence may exaggerate losses.
Because this method contemplates the offsetting gains the parties collected

261. See In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re
AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2006 WL 903236, at *18
n.25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) ("[This opinion] should not be read as an unconditional
endorsement of FIFO as the method for matching purchases and sales for the calculation of
damages in securities fraud litigation. Rather, the insignificance of the methodology applied
in this case makes it counter-productive to require Plaintiffs to revise the Plan of Allocation
and reinitiate the Notice period in order to calculate damages according to LIFO."); In re
Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 304 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (resorting to FIFO
for the immediate narrow purpose of evaluating the plaintiffs, but noting that the court's use
of FIFO "in no way demonstrates a modicum of approval of FIFO."); Thompson v. Shaw
Group, Inc., No. Civ.A.04-1685, 2004 WL 2988503, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2004).
262. 2004 WL 2988503.
263. Id. at*1.
264. Id. at *5.
265. Id.
266. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. C
01-20418 JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27008, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004).
267. In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting In re
Cable & Wireless, PLC Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 378-79 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
268. See id.
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during the class period, many courts have found that it is a better
269
measurement of damages.
Many district courts have used LIFO to approve the lead plaintiff in
securities fraud class actions. 270 Remarking that "' [t]hings are not always
what they seem,"' the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in In re Comdisco Securities Litigation271 found one plaintiffs
claim that it suffered losses in connection with its investment in Comdisco
common stock a "mirage created by [the plaintiff's] adoption of a FIFO...
approach to its dealings in the stock."' 272 The court held that when those
transactions "are properly matched, rather than by the impermissible
application of a FIFO methodology.. . [the plaintiffs] Class Period sales at
inflated prices caused it to derive unwitting benefits rather than true losses
from the alleged securities fraud. '2 73 The court thus followed the host of
cases that reject "the kind of artificial 'loss' that is manufactured by [the
plaintiffs] attempted FIFO construct in favor of a calculation that properly

269. See id. at 102.
270. See In re Organogenesis Sec. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 397, 402 (D. Mass. 2007) ("Like
other courts that have examined the issue, this court concludes as a matter of law that LIFO
is the preferred approach for assessing class period damage."); Johnson v. Dana Corp., 236
F.R.D. 349, 353 (N.D. Ohio 2006) ("[T]o determine which party has the largest financial
interest for the purposes of appointing a lead plaintiff, this court endorses the use of LIFO
over FIFO."); In re Doral Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 414 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) ("It is unclear... whether all of the parties calculated using [LIFO], as opposed to
FIFO. The latter has fallen out of favor in this District, given its tendency to overstate the
losses of institutional investors and to understate gains made from stock sold during the class
period."); Hill v. Tribune Co., No. 05 C 2602, 2005 WL 3299144 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13,
2005) ("The current majority view... is that securities fraud losses should be calculated
using LIFO.... LIFO is also often used in determining the largest financial interest for
purposes of the PSLRA lead plaintiff presumption." (citation omitted)); In re eSpeed, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Because [LIFO] contemplates the
offsetting gains the parties collected during the class period, it is a better measurement of the
true damages sustained by the plaintiffs."); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 334, 337
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("It is not clear... whether all of the parties made their calculations
using [LIFO], as opposed to FIFO. The latter has fallen out of favor in this District because
of its tendency to overstate the losses of institutional investors and to understate gains made
from stock sold during the class period."); Arenson v. Broadcom Corp., No. SA CV 02301GLT, 2004 WL 3253646, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) ("Applying a LIFO
methodology is supported by adequate authority, especially in light of the body of case law
rejecting FIFO."); In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., No. 5:03 CV 2166, 2004
WL 3314943, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 12, 2004) ("FIFO grossly inflates the Institutional
Funds' damages because the Institutional Funds are a 'net seller' of Goodyear stock."); In re
Cable & Wireless, PLC Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 379 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[The plaintiff's]
loss is not as significant as alleged, because [the plaintiff] used an unaccepted method of
calculating its loss."); In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945-46 (N.D. Ill.
2001); In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., No. C-93-1037-VRW, 1999 WL 707737, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1999) ("[U]se of the 'first in, first out' method of pairing purchases and
sales of shares will identify damages where in reality there may be none; the 'FIFO'
assumption is in no way based on actual trading practices in general, let alone the trades of
actual claimants.").
271. 150 F.Supp. 2d 943.
272. Id. at 945.
273. Id.
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nets out purchases and274
sales during the class period and determines gains or
losses in those terms."
Courts have also used LIFO to calculate shareholders' final damages
awards in securities fraud actions. 275 In SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,2 7 6 the
SEC, National Association of Securities Dealers, New York Stock
Exchange, and state regulators conducted investigations of potential
conflicts of interest in equity research analysis that culminated in the Global
Research Analyst Settlement between the SEC and twelve financial
institutions and two individuals. 2 77 The distribution fund administrator's
settlement plan approved by the court mandated the use of LIFO for
determining compensation amounts. 278 The settlement plan dictated, in
relevant part, that "eligible losses will be calculated on a last-in, first-out
('LIFO') accounting basis and will include commissions and other fees
279
charged by Settling Firms to the extent practicable.
So, under LIFO, sales during the class period are matched with the latest
purchases to compute gains or losses on individual transactions. Since
these latest purchases were usually made during the class period, gains
resulting from sales during the class period at an artificially inflated price
will be included in the damages calculation. Courts using LIFO, which
"properly nets out purchases and sales during the class period and
determines gains or losses in those terms," are therefore "all of a piece with
the concept of 'actual damages' recovery that is uniformly embraced" by
courts taking the netting approach
and viewing compensation as the
280
primary objective of Rule IOb-5.
3. Law and Accounting
a. Weak Relationship
Using inventory methods such as FIFO or LIFO to calculate damages in
Rule 1Ob-5 actions begs the question: what exactly is the relationship
between the law and accounting? Perhaps none exists other than the
happenstance that some common valuation methods are used in both
disciplines. Indeed, the heated debate amongst the courts in Rule 1Ob-5
actions seems to flow, albeit sometimes inconspicuously, from their
particular legal agendas. Not coincidentally, courts advocating deterrence
and the transactional approach tend to favor FIFO, which naturally excludes1
28
many or all gains during the class period and thereby increases damages.
274. Id. at 946.
275. See In re eSpeed, 232 F.R.D. at 101.
276. No. 03 Civ.2937(WHP), 2005 WL 217018 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2005).
277. Id. at *1.
278. Id. at *7.
279. Id.
280. See In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. I11.
2001).
281. See, e.g., Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No.
C 01-20418 JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27008, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004); In re

2009]

RULE lOb-5 AND OFFSETTING LOSSES BY GAINS

3079

Conversely, courts supporting compensation and the netting approach tend
to favor LIFO, which usually recognizes greater gains during the class
period and thereby decreases potential damages. 282 Choosing a method
based solely on such objectives may be completely justified, assuming that
courts of law are not at all fettered by accepted principles and standards in
the accounting world.
b. Semistrong Relationship
A glance at the tortuous history of these inventory methods suggests,
however, that the courts have played a considerable role in their
development alongside other governmental, regulatory, and professional
institutions. 283 LIFO evolved from the "base-stock" method used in
England as early as the mid-nineteenth century. 284 American companies
that adopted these methods during the early 1900s faced stem opposition
from the Internal Revenue Bureau, and, by 1919, the Treasury Department
permitted taxpayers to use only FIFO and average cost methods for physical
inventories. 28 5 Although not specifically addressing the use of LIFO,
Justice Louis Brandeis writing for the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Kansas
City StructuralSteel Company286 in 1930 rejected the use of the base-stock
method for determining taxable income because it did not "conform with
287
the general or best accounting methods and [was] apparently obsolete."
With the defeat dealt by the Supreme Court, advocates of LIFO seeking288a
new battleground abandoned the courts for the halls of Congress.
"[I]nitiated by big business'[s] interests, impacted by the economic realities
of the Depression and New Deal tax policy, and mediated through the
professional aspirations of accountants and policy experts within Congress
and the Treasury Department," LIFO was finally embraced and extended to
all taxpayers with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1939.289
The courts have likewise taken part in the continual book-tax conformity
debate: "[w]hen book-tax conformity has been put at issue as a matter of
substantive tax law by the IRS, the legal and accounting professions, and
Schering-Plough Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A. 01-0829, 2003 WL 25547564, at *9 (D.N.J.
Oct. 10, 2003).
282. See, e.g., Arenson v. Broadcom Corp., No. SA CV 02-301GLT, 2004 WL 3253646,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004); In re Comdisco, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 945-46.
283. See, e.g., Stephen C. Lessard, Comment, Giving Life to LIFO: Adoption of the LIFO
Method of Inventory Valuation by the Income Tax Code, 60 TAX LAW. 781 (2007).
284. Id. at 783-84 ("The base-stock method treated the portion of the taxpayer's
inventory considered necessary to the ongoing business of the concern as though it were a
fixed asset and valued it at its original cost basis. As the inventory was depleted, it was
replaced by new material, which was written down to the original cost of the base-stock. As
utilized, inventory above the base-stock level was valued at the lower of cost or market
price.").
285. See id. at 786; see also supra note 147.
286. 281 U.S. 264 (1930).
287. See id. at 269; Lessard, supra note 283, at 786-89.
288. See Lessard, supra note 283, at 788.
289. See id. at 781, 801; see also Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 862.
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the courts, the result has been a well-documented roller coaster
ride .. ,"290 Stating the general rule for methods of accounting, section
446 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides that "[t]axable
income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of
which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books,"
with the broad exception that "[i]f no method of accounting has been
regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect
income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such
method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income. '29 1
Even so, where the IRS disallowed an excess inventory write-down and a
bad-debt reserve deduction claimed by a taxpayer, the Supreme Court in
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner292 found the presumption that the
financial reporting treatment of an item was controlling for income tax
purposes "insupportable in light of the vastly different objectives that
financial and tax accounting have." 293 Similarly, and more pertinently,
while Congress specifically mandated in 1939 that a taxpayer can use LIFO
for tax purposes only if the taxpayer also used LIFO for financial reporting
conformity requirement has proven anything but
purposes, the LIFO
2 94
straightforward.
More specifically relating to the use of inventory methods for matching
purchases and sales of securities, courts advocating FIFO in Rule lOb-5
actions have relied heavily on Treasury Regulation section 1.1012-1(c) of
the Code, which defaults to FIFO for tax purposes when securities cannot
be adequately identified. 29 5 As early as 1941, the Supreme Court in
Helvering v. Campbell,296 addressing a tax dispute over the sale of inherited
securities, affirmed the general rule of FIFO reflected in Treasury
Regulations that "shares of stock [that] cannot be identified with any
particular lots purchased [should] be charged against the earliest
purchases." 297 Similarly, the Third Circuit, in reviewing whether a
taxpayer was liable for a deficiency in income taxes on the purchase and
sale of securities, remarked that FIFO "is so old and well known that any
.extended explanation of it... would be superfluous," and that "it

290. See Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The
Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 35, 112.
291. I.R.C. § 446(a)-(b) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 471 (2006).
292. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
293. See id. at 525-31, 542.
294. See I.R.C. § 472(c), (e) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.472-2(e) (2008); Linda M. Beale,
Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter Debate: Assessing the Proposed
Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor,24 VA. TAX REV. 301, 333-34 (2004) (noting that

many commentators believe "the requirement was intended to deter the use of LIFO, on the
assumption that LIFO was generally viewed as an unsound accounting method").
295. See Treas. Reg.

accompanying text.
296. 313 U.S. 15 (1941).
297. Id. at 20-21.

§ 1.1012-1(c)

(2008); see also supra notes 253, 259 and
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establishes a presumption to be followed. '298 Especially since the Code
straddles both the law and accounting, and in view of its longstanding
precedential acceptance, some courts have presumed that the FIFO method
299
accepted for tax purposes is equally suited for Rule 1Ob-5 actions.
c. Strong Relationship
Considering the deep-rooted link between the courts and these
accounting methods, perhaps damages calculations in Rule 1Ob-5 actions
should not only contemplate the Code, but also principles and standards
generally accepted for financial reporting. Since 1973, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been the designated organization
in the private sector for establishing Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) to which public financial reporting by U.S. corporations
must conform.3 00 Those standards, officially recognized as authoritative by
the SEC 30 1 and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), 30 2 are essential to the efficient functioning of the economy
because investors, creditors, auditors, and others rely on credible,
transparent, and comparable financial information. 30 3 The major objective
of accounting for inventories, according to the FASB Accounting Standards
Codification, 30 4 is the proper determination of income through the process
of matching appropriate costs against revenues, which may be determined
under any one of several cost flow assumptions, including FIFO, average,
305
and LIFO.

298. See Holmes v. Comm'r, 134 F.2d 219, 221 (3d Cir. 1943); see also Wood v.
Comm'r, 197 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir. 1952).
299. See supra Part II.A. 1.
300. See
Financial
Accounting
Standards
Board,
Facts
About
FASB,
http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Facts About FASB];
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council,
http://www.fasb.org/fasac/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
301. See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a
Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8221, 34-47743,
IC-26028, FR-70 (Apr. 25, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333 (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm. Although the SEC has statutory authority to
establish financial accounting and reporting standards for publicly held companies under the
Exchange Act, throughout its history the SEC's policy has been "to rely on the private sector
for this function to the extent that the private sector demonstrates ability to fulfill the
responsibility in the public interest." Facts About FASB, supra note 300.
302. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, ET Section 203Accounting Principles, http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_203.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2009); Facts About FASB, supra note 300.
303. See Facts About FASB, supra note 300.
304. See News Release, FASB Accounting Standards Codification Expected to Officially
Launch on July 1, 2009 (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/
nrl20408.shtml; see also Bruce Pounder, Framing the Future: A First Look at FASB's
GAAP Codification, J. ACCOUNTANCY, May 2008, at 40 (explaining that the codification will
be the single source of authoritative GAAP, overriding all existing literature).
305. See FASB Accounting Standards Codification §§ 330-10-10-1, 330-10-30-9
[hereinafter FASB Codification], available at http://asc.fasb.org/home; see also Stephen A.
Zeff, Evolution of US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (July 12, 2004)
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Although the FASB's GAAP are currently authoritative in the United
States, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been
developing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)-a set of
accounting standards that is becoming the global standard for the
preparation of public company financial statements. 306 As more than
12,000 companies around the world have already adopted IFRS, the SEC,
backed by the FASB and the AICPA, has unanimously agreed to a series of
steps that could lead to the required use of .IFRS by publicly traded
companies in the United States by 2014.307 The FASB and the IASB have
made great strides to converge the content of IFRS and U.S. GAAP so that
most or all of the key differences will be resolved by the time the SEC
allows or mandates the use of IFRS for U.S. publicly traded companies. 308
(unpublished paper), availableat http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0407zeffisgaap.pdf. The
theoretical foundation for LIFO is in the now largely abandoned "matching principle"
popularized during the late 1930s and early 1940s, which emphasized the matching of
revenues and expenses in the income statement with assets and liabilities dependent on the
outcome of this matching. Id. at 4. The Committee on Accounting Procedure issued
Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 29 in 1947 allowing the FIFO, LIFO, and average
methods, and issued ARB 43 in 1953 codifying previous ARBs and confirming LIFO as an
accepted accounting method. Id. at 5. By 1975, however, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) unanimously issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
2 and 5, signaling its belief in the primacy of balance sheet accuracy with the definitions of
assets and liabilities governing the recording of revenues and expenses, not the other way
around as under the "matching principle." Id. at 17.
306. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, IFRS FAQs,
http://www.ifrs.com/ifrs-faqs.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter IFRS FAQs].
307. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting Vision: A
Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1 (2008); IFRS FAQs, supra note
306. For the SEC, see Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, 73 Fed. Reg.
70,815 (proposed Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 240, 244 &
249), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8982fr.pdf, American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, SEC Unanimously Approves Exposing Proposed
IFRS Roadmap for Public Comment, http://www.ifrs.com/updates/sec/SEC approves.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009). For the FASB, see A Roadmap for Convergence Between IFRSs
and US GAAP-2006-2008: Memorandum of Understanding Between the FASB and the
IASB (Feb. 27, 2006) (unpublished memorandum), available at http://www.iasb.
org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63FB-56DB-4B78-B7AF-49BBAI 8C98D9/0/MoU.pdf;
American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, A Roadmap for Convergence Between IFRS and
US GAAP-2006-2008: Memorandum of Understanding Between the FASB and the IASB,
http://www.ifrs.com/updates/fasb/memorandum.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). For the
AICPA, see News Release, Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, AICPA Statement on
SEC Roadmap for IFRS (Aug. 27, 2008), availableat http://www.aicpa.org/download/news/
2008/AICPASTATEMENTON SEC ROADMAPFORIFRS.pdf.
308. See, e.g., Barry J. Epstein, Early Warning: Recent and Forthcoming Financial
Reporting Developments that May Spur Business Litigation, SEC. LITIG. REP.
(Thompson/West, Minn.), Oct. 2006, at 9 (discussing recent GAAP developments and
anticipated new standards, with an emphasis on those changes that are most likely to create
confusion or opportunities for mischief); Lawrence M. Gill, IFRS: Coming to America:
What CPAs Need to Know About the New Global GAAP, J. ACCOUNTANCY, June 2007, at 70
(explaining that "it is not simply a philosophical difference between a rules-based approach
and a principles-based approach that accounts for the differences between the two systems,"
but that "[t]he systems differ conceptually on a number of points and can significantly affect
an entity's reported results.").
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One of the most significant remaining differences, however, is that
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 2 does not permit LIFO as an
30 9
inventory method.
This mounting tension in the accounting world has been aptly described
as "an irresistible force (global convergence) running smack-dab into an
immovable object (LIFO)," 3 10 since the prohibition of LIFO for financial
reporting will likely disqualify LIFO for tax purposes as well. 3 11 LIFO,
which gauges the cost of goods sold in terms of a company's most recent
inventory purchases, results in a lower tax bill than other inventory methods
during a period of increasing prices. 3 12 In fact, looking for ways to garner
more tax revenues, Congressman Charles Rangel introduced a bill in 2007
proposing various tax reforms, including repealing LIFO. 3 13 With the
forthcoming convergence and the ban on LIFO for financial reporting, that
may be unnecessary given the section 472 conformity rule requiring
taxpayers to use the same inventory method for tax purposes and financial
reporting. 314 The SEC has duly noted that companies changing to FIFO
"may experience a change in taxable income based on the difference
between inventory valued on a LIFO basis and on a FIFO basis." 3 15 While
there had been speculation that the FASB, as part of its agreement to
converge, would insist upon having an exception for LIFO, that speculation
turned out to have been unfounded as the FASB stated in a lengthy letter to
the SEC that it "strongly oppose[s]" any such exception. 3 16 As it is
309. See IASB International Accounting Standard 2.25 [hereinafter IAS], available at
http://www.iasb.org/IFRSs/IFRS.htm; see also AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS (IFRS): AN AICPA BACKGROUNDER 5
(n.d.), available at https://media.cpa2biz.com/Publication/IFRS/1924_IFRSBackgrounder_
v3_web_FINAL_06-09-08.pdf.
310. See David M. Katz, How LIFO Could Stall Global Accounting, CFO.coM, Dec. 3,
2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfnI/10239047/c_- 2984368?f.
311. See, e.g., Dennis J. Gaffney et al., IRS Provides New Safe Harborsfor Taxpayers
Using Rolling-Average Inventory Methods, 109 J. TAX'N 290, 296-97 (2008), available at
2008 WL 4893796; Wolfgang Sch6n, The Odd Couple: A Common Futurefor Financial
and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REv. 111, 120 (2005).
312. See, e.g., Helen Shaw, Will Congress Sink LIFO?: Tax-Cutters on the Prowlfor
Other Ways to Raise Federal Revenue May Well View Last-In, First-Out Inventory
Accounting as Ripe for Repeal, CFO.coM, July 7, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.
cfm/7155954.
313. See Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. (2007); Shaw,
supra note 312. Activist groups such as the LIFO Coalition, however, have been fiercely
defending the use of LIFO for tax purposes. See LIFO Coalition, LIFO Repeal Means
Massive Tax Increase on Large and Small American Businesses
(May 24, 2006)
(unpublished paper), available at http://www.aednet.org/govemment/pdf/LIFOBriefer.pdf;
SaveLIFO.org Home Page, http://savelifo.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
314. See I.R.C. § 472(c), (e) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.472-2(e) (2008); see also supra note
294 and accompanying text.
315. Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,815, 70,825
(proposed Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 240, 244 & 249),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8982.pdf.
316. See Letter from Robert E. Denham, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Found., and Robert
H. Herz, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec. & Exch.
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becoming increasingly clear that "[i]n the debate over whether U.S.
companies should adopt international accounting standards the question is
no longer if, but when and how," the convergence between GAAP and
IFRS potentially adds a new twist into the equation for choosing a method
3 17
in Rule 1Ob-5 actions.
111. EMBRACING DUALITY
As laid out in Part I, the Rule lOb-5 private right of action can be
construed narrowly based on the intent of the Exchange Act to deter fraud,
or more broadly as a judicial creation with common law roots to
compensate investors. 3 18 Part II demonstrated the seemingly inevitable
dilemma in cases involving gains and losses resulting from the same
misrepresentations: selecting a damages approach or accounting method
ostensibly entails aligning with one of the two objectives. 3 19 Rocker and In
re Cigna exemplify, however, that deciding whether to offset losses by
320
gains need not necessarily involve choosing one objective over the other.
Expanding on Rocker's "ongoing trading strategy" test, this part illustrates
how the test may not only reconcile the clash between compensation and
deterrence but also offer a more sensible means for determining if and when
to offset losses by gains. 32 1 This part also concludes that, regardless of the
damages approach taken, LIFO is the more appropriate accounting method
for Rule 1Ob-5 actions, notwithstanding that the IRS does not permit
taxpayers to use LIFO to match purchases and sales of securities and that it
will likely be prohibited for physical inventories in the coming years for
322
both financial reporting and tax purposes.
A. Choosing a DamagesApproach: Welcome to the Rocker Test
Although many courts and scholars have struggled to confine damages
under Rule 1Ob-5 to a single purpose, and consequently to a specific
approach or method in cases involving gains and losses, in truth, "[t]he
courts in the context of implied remedies generally have a broad mandate
from the Supreme Court to fashion whatever remedies may be appropriate
in order to effectuate the general congressional purposes." 323 Rather than
Comm'n (Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/FASB FAF_ResponseSEC_
Releases_msw.pdf; see also George White, LIFO vs. IFRS: Why the Impediment?,
CPA2BIz.com, June 12, 2008, http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCERCONTENT/Newsletters/Articles_2008/Tax/impediment.jsp.
317. Emily Chasan, IFRS May Lead to New U.S. Accounting Divide, REUTERS, Feb. 14,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/sphereNews/idUSN1449556920080214?sp=true&view
=sphere.
318. See supra Part I.C.
319. See supra Part II.
320. See supra Part II.A.3.
321. See infra Part III.A.
322. See infra Part III.B.
323. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 39, § 13:42 (citing J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
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taking sides, the reality, as evinced by Stoneridge, Randall, and Dura
collectively, is that the Rule 1Ob-5 private right of action was intended to
achieve both deterrence and compensation. 324 Granted, even the Supreme
Court has wavered on the relative import and manifestations of these
objectives, 325 but, in the end, both should be incorporated in an optimal
approach to damages. Yet, when confronted with the problem of gains and
losses, most courts have circumvented the issue by siding with one
objective or the other instead of fashioning a remedy that encompasses
both. 326 Answering the call, the Third Circuit courts in Rocker and In re
Cigna have introduced a test for deciding whether to offset losses by gains
that not only obviates the need to choose a single objective but also
achieves more equitable damages calculations.327
1. Ongoing Trading Strategy
Positing that "there may not be a circuit split, but rather a recognition that
either approach may be utilized depending on the facts," Rocker went on to
rule that the gains and losses should be netted since they resulted from an
"ongoing trading strategy." 32 8 An ongoing trading strategy ostensibly
occurs when an investor consciously makes a chain of investment decisions
in which each transaction interrelates with the others. The first important
feature of this test is that the transactions are "ongoing"-that an
identifiable sequence binds the transactions. An investor that transacts in a
company's stock at different points in time for different reasons, where the
decisions are truly unrelated to one another, has not engaged in an
"ongoing" strategy. The other prong of this test is that all the decisions can
be attributed to a single "strategy"-that the decision maker is aware of and
contemplates the previous transactions in the chain when making a
decision. An investor that transacts in a company's stock without any
knowledge of or relation to a separately held position in the same stock
would not be acting according to a unified strategy. When the criteria of an
ongoing trading strategy are met, however, the chain of individual
investment decisions can rationally be regarded as one large investment
decision merely broken up over time into smaller units.
Although the Rocker court framed its inquiry as determining when to
apply which approach, the ongoing trading strategy test arguably achieves
more by effectively fusing the netting and transactional ideals into one
comprehensive approach. The logic behind this test is that a chain of
transactions that are sufficiently linked can be considered one long
transaction. Offsetting losses by gains within such a chain certainly agrees
with the netting approach, which requires offsetting even between unrelated
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
(PGS),

See supra Part I.C.2-3.
See supra Part I.C.2-3.
See supra Pan II.A. 1-2.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., No. 00-5965
2007 WL 2814653, at *14-15 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2007); see also supra Part II.A.3.
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transactions. Offsetting losses by gains within a chain also aligns with the
transactional approach in that the chain is effectively deemed one long
transaction, thus producing only one gain or loss. Even the transactional
approach, which breaks trading records down into discrete transactions,
offsets losses by gains within a transaction. Just as the typical ups and
downs in the stock's price are not split up into gains and losses for a
singular transaction, so too the ups and downs from individual components
of a unitary transaction should not be separated into gains and losses.
The Rocker test thereby, at the very least, obviates the need to choose
between compensation and deterrence and, stated more opportunistically,
actually embraces and balances the two. Rather than indiscriminately
taking either the netting or transactional route, this test runs a given fact
pattern through a framework that will only offset losses by gains when
doing so coincides with both the netting and transactional thresholds. By
not adopting any hard-set rule that will predictably increase or decrease the
amount of damages, this test neither supports nor opposes either objective
of deterrence or compensation, as the determinative factor lies elsewhere.
Better said, the Rocker test can be seen as integrating the objectives of
deterrence and compensation in a cohesive manner. When an investor
executes transactions that are deemed sufficiently linked, it is only fair that
the resulting gains and losses are similarly grouped and offset so that the
investor is not overcompensated. But when transactions are deemed
independent, an investor's recoverable losses are not offset by otherwise
legitimate gains, thus allowing for greater deterrence in the form of greater
damages.
The Rocker test may also resolve the investor/investment incongruity
flowing from the point of view taken in a Rule 1Ob-5 action. 329 As some
courts have noted, the Exchange Act provides that no "person" shall recover
a total amount in excess of "his" actual damages on account of the act
complained of, referring to damages with respect to the investor as a whole
and thus justifying the netting approach. 330 Other courts have maintained
that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit certain acts in connection with
the "purchase or sale of any security," evidently bestowing a separate claim
upon each individual investment transaction and thereby coinciding with
the transactional approach. 33 1 The ongoing trading strategy test, however,
may reconcile these seemingly incompatible terminologies. When an
investor engages in an ongoing trading strategy, there is ultimately only one
investor and one, albeit unitary, investment transaction and, hence, one net
claim for damages.
But when an investor's transactions comprise
independent trading strategies, the investor's losses on certain investment
transactions should not be offset by gains on other transactions that are
completely unrelated to his claim for damages.

329. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 108, 144 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 44, 145 and accompanying text.
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Granted, advocates of the netting approach can still rationalize offsetting
losses by gains even across independent trading strategies. After all, the
investor's gains and losses result from the same artificial inflation and
subsequent drop in the stock's price owing to the alleged
misrepresentations. 332 Independent as they may be, the investor arguably
receives a windfall by being compensated for losses that were mitigated by
corresponding gains. 333 Moreover, interpreting "actual damages on account
of the act complained of" literally suggests that all effects of the alleged act
should be accounted for in calculating damages. 334 These contentions are
nonetheless counteracted by the reality that investors fortunate enough to
have gained from the misrepresentations do not have to give their profits
back. 335 With that undisputed shelter for gains in mind, there is ample
room to differentiate those circumstances in which an investor's gains
remain protected from those in which gains are sufficiently linked to losses
so as to require their aggregation in calculating damages.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the Rocker test, in contrast to the
rigid netting and transactional approaches, is the fruition of a more
evenhanded mechanism for calculating damages. On one hand, the netting
approach might be too harsh on investors by automatically reducing losses
by completely independent and unrelated gains, even though investors that
fortuitously enjoyed only gains from the misrepresentations are not required
to give them back. On the other hand, the transactional approach that
arbitrarily cherry-picks the losing transactions but ignores the gains not
only unduly benefits an investor who made a string of related transactions
but also creates a perverse incentive for investors intentionally to seek out
fraudulent companies, knowing that they can keep their gains and still
recover their losses. The discerning ongoing trading strategy test, however,
avoids these unjust and undesirable shortcomings by offsetting transactions
if, and only if, they are sufficiently linked.
2. Independent Trading Strategies
After presenting an impartial overview of the damages approach
controversy, In re Cigna recognized that offsetting losses by gains may not
always be appropriate and thus entertained "the vitality of transaction-based
methodologies on [its] facts." 336 A prime example is where an investor
disperses his assets among various independent managers, with each
manager investing according to his own strategy. Suppose Investor Bear
decides to invest his money in two funds. Bear gives his money to these
funds but has no specific knowledge of how these funds choose to invest his
money. One fund sells its position in Fraud, Inc. during the class period at

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See WONG, supra note 137, at 16.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See Pritchard, supra note 59, at 224.
See In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 354 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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an artificially inflated price for a gain, while the other fund sells its position
in Fraud, Inc. after corrective statements are made and the stock's price
drops, resulting in a loss. Bear thus recognizes a gain and a loss as a result
of the same misrepresentations.
Since these two funds engaged in
independent trading strategies and Bear had no control of any of his
positions in Fraud, Inc., however, offsetting his losses by his gains may not
be appropriate.
A somewhat more novel situation is where an investor allocates his
money between multiple independent funds and manages these funds
separately according to different strategies. Suppose Investor Merrill
creates two funds, Fund A and Fund B. Merrill happens to purchase shares
of Fraud, Inc., among others, in both funds. During 2007, Merrill needs
some cash and liquidates his positions in Fund A and realizes a gain on his
sale of Fraud, Inc. at an artificially inflated price. Merrill later sells his
positions in Fund B in 2008 after corrective statements are made and the
stock's price drops, resulting in a loss. So Merrill realizes a gain from Fund
A and a loss from Fund B on his holdings in the same stock, although his
decisions to sell his positions in Fraud, Inc. were completely unrelated to
each other. Since Merrill did not engage in an ongoing strategy to manage
his positions in Fraud, Inc., offsetting his losses by his gains may not be
appropriate.
Another case in point is where an investor makes a number of
independent decisions concerning the same stock. Suppose Investor
Lehman purchases shares of Fraud, Inc. in 2006 and then sells all of them in
2007 for a gain at an artificially inflated price. Later on in 2007, Lehman
again purchases shares of Fraud, Inc. but sells them in 2008 after corrective
statements are made and the stock's price drops, resulting in a loss. As a
result of the same misrepresentations, Lehman realizes a gain on his first
transaction and a loss on his second transaction. Lehman's second
transaction, however, was clearly unrelated to his first transaction since he
had already cleared his entire position from his first decision by the time he
made his second decision some time later. Accordingly, offsetting
Lehman's loss from his second transaction by the gain from his first
transaction may not be appropriate.
A natural drawback exposed by these hypotheticals is the court's added
labor in determining whether an investor's transactions constitute an
ongoing trading strategy. First, deciding when a group of transactions are
"ongoing" entails identifying some sort of consistency or pattern over a
period of time that links them together. How long the time period or how
interspersed the transactions can be, for example, are fact-sensitive
questions that must be evaluated. Moreover, the "strategy" requirement is
both subjective and relative, since it hinges on the investor's intent in
making investment decisions. Even the investor might have difficulty
ascertaining the various conscious and possibly subconscious factors that
contributed to a particular decision and how it related to others. Despite
these obstacles, Rocker demonstrates that it is often readily apparent from
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trading records whether an investor engaged in an ongoing trading strategy.
For less obvious cases, though, the ball indeed falls in the courts' court to
define the bounds of an ongoing trading strategy.
B. Choosing an Accounting Method: LIFO In, LIFO Out?
The accounting method debate, although obliquely enmeshed in the same
conflict between the dual objectives of Rule lOb-5, should really be about
properly accounting for gains and losses that accrued during the class
period. Courts have occasionally utilized these accounting methods as a
means to achieve a preconceived end-to increase or decrease damages in
line with their aims of deterrence or compensation-rather than objectively
considering which method more accurately reflects the true economic effect
of securities transactions. 337 Not only is such an objective consideration
called for by the law of "actual damages" under Rule lOb-5, 338 but the
principles and standards concerning the use of FIFO and LIFO in the
accounting world may also pertain. 339 While LIFO is clearly the more
accurate measure of damages in Rule 1Ob-5 actions, however, it may be
waning as a generally acceptable method pursuant to rising international
principles and standards.
1. The Case for LIFO
While the same fundamental principles ought to apply to the FIFO and
LIFO methods most commonly associated with physical inventories when
utilized for other purposes, a noteworthy caveat to the particular application
of these methods in Rule lOb-5 actions is the inability for consistency to
balance out results over many reporting periods. With physical inventories,
as long as a method is applied consistently, "the basis of stating inventories
does not affect the overall gain or loss on the ultimate disposition of
inventory items," since all items will eventually be accounted for, whereas
''any inconsistency in the selection or employment of a basis may
improperly affect the periodic amounts of income or loss."340 Because of
the "common use and importance of periodic statements" in financial
reporting, consistency is essential so that "the results reported may be fairly
allocated between years." 34 1 When calculating damages under Rule lOb-5,
however, only one period-the class period-matters. The method used to
match transactions during the class period will determine the extent of gains
and losses, as well as which gains and losses are included altogether, and
these results will not be tempered by other periods. Choosing the most
appropriate inventory method in this context is therefore even more critical
than it is in ordinary cost flow situations.
337. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
338. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
339. See supra Part II.B.3.
340. FASB Codification, supra note 305, § 330-10-30-15.

341. Id.
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As another aside, two alternative and occasionally more intuitive
inventory methods not even considered in Rule 1Ob-5 actions are "specific
identification" and "weighted-average. ' 34 2 Specific identification, which
"attaches the actual cost to an identifiable unit of product," is clearly the
'343
method that provides "the most precise matching of costs and revenues.
In fact, instead of defaulting to FIFO, the IRS allows investors to use
specific identification for tax purposes by matching sales with purchases in
whatever manner they choose, if specific shares were designated to be sold
at the time of sale. 344 However, specifically identifying the shares for all
purchases and sales of securities is'usually an impractical task for investors,
just as is most often the case with physical inventories. 345 The weighted
average method, which "is a means of costing ending inventory using a
weighted-average unit CoSt,' 346 is likewise not particularly apt for Rule
IOb-5 actions. First, weighted average does not actually match the
individual purchases and sales of securities. 347 Moreover, using this
method would be quite burdensome since evaluating continuous purchases
and sales of securities throughout the class period would require a
"moving" weighted average 34 8 used for perpetual inventory systems 34 9 as
opposed to the simple weighted average used for periodic inventory
50
systems.

3

Given the infeasibility of specific identification and weighted average in
Rule 1Ob-5 actions, one possible factor to consider in differentiating
between FIFO and LIFO would be which method better captures the actual
342. See HERMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra note 147, at 265-66, 268.
343. Id. at 265, 284.
344. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1012-1(c) (2008); see also WONG, supra note 137, at 5; supra note
295 and accompanying text.
345. See BRAGG, supra note 147, at 121 ("This approach is rarely used, because the
amount of paperwork and effort associated with developing unit costs is far greater than
under all other valuation techniques. It is most applicable in businesses such as home
construction, where there are few units of inventory to track, and where each item is truly
unique."); FASB Codification, supra note 305, § 330-10-30-11 ("[I]f the materials purchased
in various lots are identical and interchangeable, the use of identified cost of the various lots
may not produce the most useful financial statements. This fact has resulted in the general
acceptance of several assumptions with respect to the flow of cost factors such as FIFO,
average, and LIFO to provide practical bases for the measurement of periodic income.");
IAS, supra note 309, 2.24 ("[S]pecific identification of costs is inappropriate when there are
large numbers of items of inventory that are ordinarily interchangeable.").
346. HERMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra note 147, at 268.
347. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
348. See HERMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra note 147, at 272 ("Under perpetual
inventory procedure, firms compute a new weighted-average unit cost after each purchase by
dividing total costs of goods available for sale by total units available for sale. The unit cost
is a moving weighted-average because it changes after each purchase.").
349. See BRAGG, supra note 147, at 237 (defining "perpetual inventory" as "[a] manual or
automated inventory tracking system in which a new inventory balance is computed
continuously whenever new transactions occur"); HERMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra
note 147, at 262-65.
350. See HERIMANSON, EDWARDS & MAHER, supra note 147, at 262 ("Under periodic
inventory procedure .... [c]ompanies determine cost of goods sold only at the end of the
period as the difference between cost of goods available for sale and ending inventory.").
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flow of inventory. For physical inventories, and particularly in the case of
perishable goods, FIFO better "corresponds with the actual physical flow of
35 1
goods" since the first units bought will typically be the first units sold.
For the purpose of matching purchases and sales of securities, however,
LIFO may in fact be the more plausible interpretation of the investor's
Very often, after building up a substantial
decision-making process.
position in a company's stock over time, an investor will continue to
purchase and sell additional shares. These new purchases and sales more
likely reflect a reversed decision to add to the investor's position rather than
352
the purchase of a new position and the liquidation of the old position.
Pairing a recent purchase and sale transaction therefore often makes more
353
economic sense than pairing the sale with an older purchase.
More important than the argument that LIFO may better correspond with
the actual flow of securities, according to GAAP, "[t]he major objective in
selecting a method should be to choose the one which, under the
circumstances, most clearly reflects periodic income." 354 This guiding
principle pertains equally to damages calculations in Rule 1Ob-5 actions,
where the indisputable objective is to quantify the gain or loss that occurred
during the class period. In this respect, as many of the courts advocating
LIFO have pointed out, FIFO allows an investor to exclude arbitrarily many
or all gains from the class period by matching sales with purchases made
prior to the class period. This is not a normal function of FIFO-it is an
unintended side-effect in the Rule lOb-5 context. LIFO, on the other hand,
generally recognizes gains occurring during the class period by matching
sales with the latest purchases and is therefore the method that better
355
reflects periodic income in Rule 1Ob-5 actions.
Some courts using FIFO are not only aware of this anomalous outcome
in Rule 1Ob-5 actions, but actually insist that it makes FIFO the better
measure of gains and losses during the class period. These courts maintain
that unless the entire transaction-purchase and sale-occurs after the
356
inception of the class period, then the gain or loss should not be counted.
While this contention seems tenable, it sorely misses the point of damages
under Rule 1Ob-5-to measure "the impact of the defendant's
nondisclosures on the market value of the stock."' 357 That an investor
purchased or sold short shares before the class period does not negate the
reality that the inflated stock price resulting from the defendant's
misrepresentations caused some amount of gain or loss on the sale or cover
351. Id. at 266.
352. See WONG, supra note 137, at 5.

353. See id. Concededly, this speculation does not necessarily describe many investors'
behavior; rather, they might look at the total weighted average cost of their positions in
deciding to reverse purchases and lighten their holdings.
354. See FASB Codification, supra note 305, § 330-10-30-9; see also supra note 305 and
accompanying text.
355. See Part I.B.
356. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
357. 26 KAUFMAN, supra note 4, § 1.4.
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to purchase during the class period that would not have otherwise occurred.
Unlike FIFO, LIFO generally includes these gains or losses resulting from
an inflated stock price by matching sales with the latest purchases, which
3 58
were usually made during the class period.
This understanding likewise rebuts those courts using FIFO on the
grounds that the IRS defaults to FIFO for tax purposes. 3 59 The IRS most
likely allows taxpayers to use FIFO to match purchases and sales of
securities for the simple reason that this method generates higher tax
revenues. 360 Because the stock market (presumably) rises over the long
run, matching sales with the earliest purchases will more often than not
trigger greater taxable gains. 361 The IRS does not deal with the
coincidental ramifications of FIFO in Rule 1Ob-5 actions, however, in
which transactions are completely excluded. Rest assured, the IRS would
not allow FIFO if it enabled investors to completely avoid taxable gains.
Consequently, the IRS's use of FIFO for tax purposes does not necessarily
imply that FIFO is the more appropriate method for securities transactions,
and certainly not for Rule 1Ob-5 actions.
2. The Case Against LIFO
Despite the compelling argument for LIFO in Rule 1Ob-5 actions and the
insignificance of the IRS's approval of FIFO for matching purchases and
sales of securities for tax purposes, the looming demise of LIFO in the
accounting world may be reason for concern. The convergence between
GAAP and IFRS, coupled with the book-tax conformity rule, most likely
spells the end of LIFO for physical inventories for both financial reporting
and tax purposes. 362 Whether the ban signifies a greater fundamental and
categorical rejection of LIFO for all kinds of inventories and valuations,

358. Gains could technically be excluded under LIFO as well if more shares were sold
than all class period purchases, so that some sales would have to be matched with preclass
period purchases. A more effective solution to this problem of excluding gains or losses
may lie in a "mark-to-market" regime that revalues the shares held before the class period to
the stock's market price as of the inception of the class period, and then uses that value for
computing damages under FIFO or LIFO. Mark-to-market is now a generally accepted
accounting methodology of assigning a value to a position held in a financial instrument
based on its current market price. See FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
157; FASB Codification, supra note 305, § 320-10-35-1; IAS, supra note 309, 39.46. As
courts have not yet considered such a system in Rule lOb-5 actions, this Note merely
undertakes to resolve which unmodified method, FIFO or LIFO, is the better of the two.
359. See supra notes 253-54, 259 and accompanying text.
360. See WONG, supra note 137, at 5.
361. See id. at 5 n.12; see also In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., No. 01 C 2110, 2004 WL
905938, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2004) ("[T]he reasons for that treatment for income tax
purposes are readily apparent: In light of the long-term trend of increasing values in stocks,
plus the facts (1) that FIFO rather than LIFO therefore typically increases the measurement
of currently recordable gains and (2) that stocks held until death get a stepped-up basis while
at the same time escaping income taxation entirely, what other approach might be expected
from taxing authorities who are properly interested in maximizing the benefits to the fisc?").
362. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
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however, remains unclear. While IAS 2, which bans LIFO, 363 technically
excludes certain kinds of inventories-including financial instrumentsfrom its scope, 364 that can be attributed to their separate and more detailed
treatment in other standards. 365 Moreover, even if IAS 2 is not necessarily
aimed at all kinds of inventories and valuations, its ban on LIFO may
ultimately flow through to other areas, such as the matching of purchases
and sales of securities, via implicated U.S. GAAP standards and Code
provisions.
Supposing the ban on LIFO for physical inventories for financial
reporting and tax purposes does mushroom into the general repudiation of
the method in all circumstances, courts calculating damages in Rule 1Ob-5
actions may want to reconsider using a method rendered obsolete in the
accounting world. Clearly, the methods used in securities litigation are not
actually bound by financial reporting and tax authorities-especially where
the courts have soundly distinguished the inapposite outcomes FIFO
produces in Rule lOb-5 actions from ordinary cost flow situations. At the
same time, the courts have historically cooperated with other governmental,
regulatory, and professional institutions in determining how and when these
methods should be used. 366 Even though the logic for LIFO in Rule I Ob-5
actions has not changed, nor should it necessarily hinge on tax laws or
financial reporting standards, the loss of LIFO for real inventory costing
will likely relegate it to a position of less familiarity and acceptance. That
said, courts should continue to use LIFO, but look out for actions taken by
the SEC, IRS, FASB, IASB, AICPA, and Congress in the coming years that
could potentially reach damages calculations in Rule 1Ob-5 actions.
CONCLUSION

Promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to deter fraud but
the Rule
modeled after common law tort actions to compensate investors, 367
Most
lOb-5 private right of action was a circuit split waiting to happen.
courts encountering the problem of gains and losses have systematically
fallen in line with either of the opposing damages approaches and
accounting methods stemming from the seemingly conflicting origins and
objectives of Rule lOb-5. 368 This Note, however, presents a roadmap for
calculating damages that embraces its inherent duality and properly
accounts for gains and losses during the class period. 369 First, this Note
contends that losses should be offset by gains if, and only if, they are
sufficiently linked by an ongoing trading strategy. 3 70 Second, this Note
363. See IAS, supra note 309, 2.25; see also supra note 309 and accompanying text.
364. See IAS, supra note 309, 2.2(b).
365. See id. 32, 39.
366. See supra Part II.B.3.b-c.

367.
368.
369.
370.

See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part

I.C.
II.
III.
III.A.

3094

[Vol. 77

FORDHAMLAWREVIEW

concludes that LIFO is the more appropriate method for matching
purchases and sales of securities despite contrary tax laws and
developments in the accounting world. 3 71 Rather than surmising that
"the function of securities law is 'the protection of investors' or
'compensation for wrongs,"' these proposals aspire to the paramount
objective of "efficient operation of the markets." 3 72 In that way, as "every
great work of art has two faces, one toward its own time and one toward
[the future]," 373 the deep-rooted yet dynamic Rule 1Ob-5 may entertain the
new day's challenge of calculating damages.

371. See supra Part III.B.
372. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 129, at 613; supra text accompanying note
131.

373. DANIEL BARENBOIM & EDWARD W. SAID, PARALLELS
EXPLORATIONS IN MUSIC AND SOCIETY 52 (Vintage Books 2004) (2002).
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PARADOXES:

